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Choisir, c’était renoncer pour toujours, pour
jamais, à tout le reste –et la quantité nom-
breuse de ce reste demeurait préférable à
n’importe quelle unité.
—André Gide
Chacune de nos décisions est une pâque, c’est-
à-dire une forme de mort et de résurrection.
—François Varillon
J’ai choisi selon ma conscience. J’ai accepté
de tout perdre et j’ai tout perdu.
—Hélie de Saint Marc
[49, 50, 156, 129]
To choose, was to give up forever any chance of
the remainder, and the innumerable quantity
of that remainder always seemed preferable to
any single item whatever.
—André Gide
Every decision we make is a passover, that is,
a form of death and resurrection.
—François Varillon
I chose according to my conscience. I accepted
to lose everything and everything I lost.
—Hélie de Saint Marc
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SUMMARY
As the number of autonomous decision-making entities in the electricity grid
increases, it is necessary to develop (1) new decision-making capabilities embedded
within the grid’s control and management, and (2) new grid architecture models
ensuring that both individual and system objectives are met. This work develops
(1) new decision-making mechanisms enabling residential energy users and electricity
providers to interact through the use of dynamic price signals, and (2) policy recom-
mendations to facilitate the emergence of shared architecture models describing the
future state of the electricity grid. In the first part, two optimization models that
capture the emerging flexible consumption, storage, and generation capabilities of
residential end-users are formulated. An economic dispatch model that explicitly ac-
counts for end-users’ internal dynamics is proposed. A non-iterative pricing algorithm
using convex and inverse linear programming is developed to induce autonomous res-
idential end-users to behave cooperatively and minimize the provider’s generation
costs. In the second part, several factors that make the development of grid architec-
ture models necessary from a public policy standpoint are identified and discussed.
The grid architecture problem is rigorously framed as both a market failure legit-
imizing government intervention, and a meta-problem requiring the development of
non-conventional methods of solution. A policy approach drawing on the theoretical




Our energy system is undergoing fundamental changes to support the development
of a sustainable society. In particular, significant investments are being made to
transform electrical grids into ‘smart grids’ in an effort to address three inter-related
challenges: energy security, economic growth and environmental protection. Contrary
to the traditional grid components, all the decision-making agents present in emerging
grids, either automated or human, will make decisions to achieve their individual
objectives while contributing to the overall objectives of the grid. Thus, the secure
evolution of the grid and its ability to realize its objectives depend on:
1. The development of decision-making capabilities embedded within the grid’s
control and management;
2. The development of a shared, system-level vision for the future state of the grid;
this vision should engage the various decision-making entities involved, integrate
their respective efforts, and eventually ensure that both individual and system
objectives are met.
In this context, the objectives of the present research were twofold:
1. to develop specific decision-making mechanisms enabling residential energy users
and electricity providers to interact through the use of electricity price signals;
2. to develop policy recommendations to facilitate the emergence of shared archi-
tecture models describing the future state of the electricity grid.
In this introductory chapter, we briefly present a generic framework encompassing
the current and future decision-making entities across the grid at multiple spatial
1
and temporal scales. The goal is to relate the various aspects of our work to this
framework. We then provide an overview of the contributions of the present research
to both the technical and policy fields.
The concept of energy prosumer allows us to formally represent both current
and future decision-making entities across the grid. We define energy prosumers as
cyber-physical entities that can consume, produce, store and/or transport electricity.
Prosumers have their own objectives associated with the control and utilization of
electricity. These objectives are aligned with the goals and preferences of the pro-
sumer owners –individuals or organizations. Prosumers can also exchange energy
services externally with other prosumers. Any decision-making component in today’s
electricity grid can be modeled as a prosumer. A home, a building, and a microgrid
are each prosumers. A utility grid, an electric vehicle, and even individual appliances
such as a laptop computer can also be represented as prosumers. The prosumer ab-
straction is also adapted to the future evolutions of the grid where each component
is likely to gain access to additional energy functions.
The concept of prosumer, the objective functions set at the prosumer and system
levels, and the concepts of rules and mechanisms from hierarchy theory [4] can all
be used to characterize the grid and its constitutive entities from a decision-making
standpoint (Figure 1.1).
At the system level, a community of decision makers consisting of prosumer owners,
experts and elected officials set objectives for the entire grid. These objectives are
multidimensional, and sometime contradictory; they vary over time as the various
actors gain a shared understanding of (a) what the future grid should look like, and
(b) how their environment is changing. Decision-makers at the system level also set




































way their internal functions are implemented. At the prosumer level, prosumer owners
have their own goals and preferences associated with the control and utilization of
electricity. Their objectives are based on a complex set of values (including economic,
reliability, or sustainability aspects), and their objective functions also vary over time
as they adapt to a changing environment. Prosumer owners set mechanisms to pursue
their objectives within the rules set at the system level.
The present research relates to the generic framework summarized in Figure 1.1
as follows:
• The first two chapters focus on specific decision-making mechanisms enabling
residential energy prosumers and electricity providers (which can be seen as
prosumers of larger size) to interact through the use of electricity price signals:
Chapter 2 presents an energy scheduling algorithm for residential prosumers
based on mixed-integer linear programming. The goal of Chapter 2 is to illus-
trate the need for Home Energy Management Systems (HEMS) in the future
electricity grid. Chapter 3 develops an electricity pricing scheme that induces
autonomous residential prosumers to behave cooperatively and minimize the
provider’s generation costs. This pricing mechanism is to be used by electricity
providers.
• Chapter 4 focuses on the process of elaborating rules for the future grid: policy
recommendations are developed to facilitate the emergence of shared architec-
ture models for the future grid.
The three chapters explore decision-making in the future electricity grid from
different perspectives and are largely independent of one another. In Chapter 2, the
decisions considered (namely: selecting an optimal energy usage strategy in response
to dynamic prices) are made at the local level. These decisions impact primarily
the residential prosumer himself, and secondarily the rest of the system. In Chapter
4
3, the decisions considered (namely: selecting the best pricing strategy) are made
at the local level (the electricity provider makes the decision). These decisions aim
to have a positive impact on some system-level objectives; they also have secondary
effects on the prosumers. Finally, the decisions considered in Chapter 4 (namely: the
development and selection of architecture models for the future grid) are made at the
system level. These decisions aim to positively impact some system-level objectives.
Figure 1.2 maps the loci and impact levels for the decisions considered in each of the
three chapters.
Figure 1.2: Loci and impact levels for the various types of decisions considered in the
present work. HEMS refers to Chapter 2, Prices refers to Chapter 3, Arch. models
refers to Chapter 4.
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The technical contributions of the present research are as follows:
Contribution 1: We propose two optimization models that capture the emerg-
ing flexible consumption, storage, and generation capabilities of residential end-
users as well as the ability to buy from and sell electricity to the provider.
Existing models are usually limited to flexible consumption and do not account
for bidirectional power flows.
Contribution 2: For any given end-user, we provide a sufficient constraint that
allows us to model an arbitrary number of flexible loads with only one decision
variable per time period. Existing models require one variable per time period
per flexible load.
Contribution 3: We propose an economic dispatch model that explicitly ac-
counts for end-users’ internal dynamics. Existing models treat residential de-
mand as an exogenous input. We propose to solve this enhanced economic
dispatch in a distributed way using multi-level primal decomposition to reduce
the size of the problem, and increase end-user privacy protection. To this end,
we aggregate and disaggregate consumption, storage and generation capabilities
across clusters of residential end-users.
Contribution 4: We propose a non-iterative pricing algorithm using convex
programming and inverse linear programming. Different from existing non-
iterative algorithms, our approach does not use backward induction and does
not require closed-form expressions. To the best of our knowledge, this work is
the first practical application of inverse linear programming.
Contribution 5: We ensure fairness by billing each end-user according to
his contribution towards minimizing the provider’s generation costs. Existing
studies aim to select a pricing scheme that achieves optimality, but do not
address the issue of fairness.
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Contribution 6: We present extensive results obtained for two real-data test
cases that demonstrate the proposed approach. Most existing studies present
simulation results for test cases using synthetic data for the end-users.
The policy contributions of the present research are as follows:
Contribution 7: We identify and discuss three factors that make the devel-
opment of architecture models necessary from a public policy standpoint: (1)
the increasing collaborative nature of the grid, (2) the blurring of boundaries
between the various disciplines concerned with the grid, and (3) the blurring of
functions performed by some of the grid components.
Contribution 8: We rigorously frame the grid architecture problem as both
a market failure legitimizing government intervention, and a metaproblem re-
quiring the development of non-conventional methods of solution. We concep-
tualize the substantive problem as distances –spatial, temporal, conceptual and
cultural– that prevent the various communities-of-practice involved to effec-
tively cooperate.
Contribution 9: We propose a scalable policy approach to reduce these dis-
tances drawing on the concepts of broker, boundary object and boundary orga-
nization. An experiment of the proposed approach at the research group level
is discussed and policy recommendations are provided to scale up the approach
to the national level.
7
CHAPTER II
A MODEL FOR RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY
OPTIMIZATION IN DYNAMIC PRICING
ENVIRONMENTS
2.1 Introduction
Major forces are creating a new paradigm on residential electricity markets as en-
ergy optimization becomes an increasingly important challenge in our society1. New
technologies are being deployed including advanced meters [29], controllable appli-
ances [158], distributed generation [9], energy storage systems (PHEV batteries [128],
stand-alone storage systems [5], [16]), and communications capabilities [98]. New
legislations are being proposed to allow electricity consumers –and any third parties
they designate– to access their electricity usage and pricing information [151], [14].
Finally, new dynamic pricing policies are likely to be implemented at the retail level
over the next years [40, 41, 64, 149].
These multiple developments will contribute to enabling increased customer par-
ticipation, one of the major objectives of the future grid [152]. Demand response
actions in particular, could represent up to 45% of the expected smart grid benefits
in the U.S. over the next decade [97]. Increased customers participation within the
grid is a sign that the consumer-provider relation is changing, and could prefigure
larger systemic changes across the electricity industry in the long term [55].
However, some of these changes have already caused backlash from customers,
forcing for instance some energy providers to offer smart meter opt-out programs
1The work presented in this chapter was published in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, see [70]
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[118]. Such conflicts between consumer empowerment and technology deployment
–with groups of residential consumers choosing not to participate– could negatively
affect the effectiveness of an integrated smart grid.
Stakeholders concerns regarding the ongoing changes include higher electricity bills
[75], cyber-security, and privacy issues [120, 96, 102]. With new technologies deployed
and new pricing policies implemented, the number of options offered to residential
customers in terms of choices increases drastically. This also increases the number
of decision parameters and makes home energy management too complex for the
common user to solve manually. Additionally, while customers value usage or pricing
information, they also want to be hands-off: the per capita time spent consuming
information in the U.S. has risen nearly 60% from 1980 levels [8]. Increased complexity
and information saturation eventually result in highly suboptimal energy utilization
with customers not scheduling demand optimally, possibly leading to electricity bills
higher than before.
Additional concerns from electricity providers and policy makers include the depth
of impact that generalized dynamic pricing policies could have on consumption levels,
the actual consumers ability to respond to price signals, and the practical implemen-
tation of these pricing policies. The systemic consequences and their impact on the
stakeholders involved also need to be further analyzed and understood in order to
take appropriate policy measures.
To address these concerns, advanced modeling of residential electricity consumers
in a dynamic pricing environment is required. This chapter proposes an example of
such modeling framework based on mixed-integer linear programming (MILP), with
a robust optimization approach which minimizes the impact of stochastic input on
the objective function while preserving acceptable running times. From an industry
or policy perspective, this framework can be used to simulate and analyze the impact
of the various ongoing changes on residential electricity markets—and in particular
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the use of dynamic pricing as a tool for effective demand side management [48].
From a consumer’s perspective, this framework can be used to implement a home
energy controller and minimize energy costs—a perspective developed in detail in
this chapter.
In the recent literature [103, 104, 56, 28], it has been recognized that the scheduling
problem that consists of coordinating and optimizing the operation of various energy
sources and loads—in order to minimize the energy costs—can be formulated as
a linear programming problem. Our modeling framework however differs from the
recent literature in several ways. It covers the electricity consumption and generation
functions, but also electricity storage, and the impact of these capabilities on the
peak-toaverage ratio (PAR) is analyzed. It integrates loads with both continuous
and discrete consumption levels, while the hourly-based consumption scheduled for
each appliance is usually modeled as a continuous variable [103, 56, 28]. For this
purpose, our MILP-based framework explicitly extends the formulation proposed in
[103]. In [56], discrete variables are introduced, but with a coarser system granularity,
which does not scale down to the appliance level. Finally, our framework introduces
multiple time scales adapted to different types of devices. The work presented in this
chapter extends our earlier conference paper [69] in several directions: we propose
a full description of our modeling framework, and extend our previous discussion to
scenarios involving multiple electricity providers; stochastic inputs are treated with a
robust optimization approach to decrease uncertainty at an acceptable computational
cost; complex pricing mechanisms are considered; finally, performance of the proposed
solution is assessed against a reference case.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 defines the electrical
system considered. Section 2.3 discusses modeling aspects. Section 2.4 describes the
optimization constraints considered. Section 2.5 formulates the optimization problem
and proposes a solution method. Section 2.6 defines a reference case for comparisons
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and Section 2.7 evaluates the performance of the proposed method. Section 2.8
concludes this chapter.
2.2 System definition
An electrical home can be defined as a small-scale energy system operating at the
home level. In this chapter, the electrical system considered in order to mathemat-
ically formulate the optimization problem consists of the following components: a
set of solar photovoltaic modules, a small wind turbine, a standalone genset, an en-
ergy storage system, an electric vehicle, and a set of controllable and non-controllable
appliances. The system considered can easily be tailored to a specific home grid
configuration by disabling some of the components mentioned above if needed.
The non-controllable appliances include all the domestic appliances the consumer
wants to be able to turn on and off immediately, such as TV, microwave, lights, etc.
These loads cannot be integrated into a fully automated optimization process. The
controllable appliances include appliances such as a dishwasher, the defrost mode of
a freezer, a Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system, or a water
heater tank. The consumer is more flexible with these appliances as long as they
fulfill their role. The controllable appliances divide up into interruptible appliances,
such as HVAC systems, which may be interrupted immediately, and non-interruptible
appliances, such as a dishwasher or a washing machine, which are not designed to
allow unexpected interruptions when their cycle has started.
We assume that weather forecasts allow a day-ahead estimation of the expected
values of local energy production, and that signals giving the electricity prices over a
time horizon D are available. We assume the presence of a module able to forecast the
expected values of the non-controllable appliances consumption based on the home
grid history data.
Our objective is to optimize the energy use –minimize the energy costs– of the
11
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τ ′ τ ′ = qτ τ ′
D
Figure 2.1: Relation between the temporal subdivisions d and d′
electrical system considered over a given time horizon D.
2.3 Time and component modeling
2.3.1 Time horizon subdivisions
Scheduling of such a variety of electric loads with behavior relevant at different time
scales requires handling temporal subdivisions. The time horizon D is divided into
N ′ adjacent time intervals d′i of same length τ
′. Define d′ = {d′1, d′2, ..., d′i, ..., d′N ′}
a subdivision of D. Over a given interval d′i the amount of power consumed or
produced by each home grid component is assumed to be constant. Also define a
second subdivision by dividing each initial interval d′i into a new set q of adjacent
time intervals dj of equal length τ (Fig. 2.1). The initial subdivision d
′ is well
adapted to the non-interruptible loads, while the new subdivision d, more precise,
is particularly adapted to the HVAC system for instance which is likely to have a
smaller characteristic time.
2.3.2 Storage system
The amount of energy E > 0 stored in the energy storage system (ESS) is one
of the state variables allowing for computing the evolution of the electrical system
considered over time. In the following formulation, E does not include any minimal
amount of energy Emin which would have to remain in the ESS at all times for
12
technical reasons. We define Rc > 0 as the maximal charging rate, and Rd > 0 as the
maximal discharging rate.
The age and past history of the ESS, the number and frequency of charging
and discharging cycles, the depth-of-discharge, as well as other factors may degrade
performance over time [37]. In the following, we assume that Emax, Rc, Rd remain
constant over time horizon D.
2.3.3 Non-interruptible appliances
Non-interruptible appliances are different because of their discrete behavior: the
appliance cycle is approached by a block of kL adjacent time intervals of length
kLτ
′, kL ∈ {0, 1, ..., N ′}. There are SL = N ′ − kL + 1 positions possible to schedule
the load L over D. Each position j is assigned a binary number δLj ∈ {0, 1} with
δLj = 1 if the load L is scheduled in the position j, and δ
L
j = 0 otherwise. We call `
the number of non-interruptible appliances.
2.3.4 Thermodynamic system
The thermodynamic system that models the house exchanges heat with two other
systems, the HVAC and the outside. In the following derivation, as an approximation,
the house is modeled as one room. This modeling could be extended using the same
formulation, to account for internal heat transfers.
The classic thermodynamics equations apply [45]:

































T r(t)− T out(t)
Req
(3)
with T r the room temperature, T out the outside temperature, T h the supply air
temperature, Mair the mass of air inside the house, c the specific heat capacity of air at
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constant pressure, Ṁ the air flow rate through the HVAC, Req the equivalent thermal
resistance of the house, (dQ/dt)losses the quantity of heat exchanged between the room
and the outside, (dQ/dt)HV AC the quantity of heat exchanged between the room and
the HVAC. Req can be estimated at first based on geometrical considerations, and
then be refined over time based on both room and outside temperatures history.
For the time subdivision d, define T r,0i the temperature of the room at the begin-
ning of the time interval di and T
r




are identically equal on di. The initial condition is given by T
init = T r,01 .
Assume that N is large enough so that τ  τT out , with τT out the characteristic
time of T out. Then we can assume that T out is constant on and equal to T outi . We
also assume that the quantity of heat (dQ/dt)HV AC is maintained constant on di and
equal to P hi . (dQ/dt)HV AC is controlled over time through the parameters T
h and Ṁ
to meet the user comfort preferences. In winter time, heat is transferred to the room
and P hi > 0. In summer time the heat flow is reversed and P
h
i < 0.












Mair · c ·Req
(4)
Solving the differential equation for T ri with the origin of time being taken at the
beginning of di :
∀t ∈ di, T ri (t) = (T
r,0
i −ReqP hi − T outi )exp(
−t






2.3.5 Recursive relation giving ESS charging status
Define for each interval di the following parameters:
E0i : the amount of energy stored at the beginning of the interval;
P
(g)
i : the power exchanged between the home grid and the distribution grid with
P
(g)
i > 0 when power is transferred from the distribution grid to the home grid;
P
(gs)




i : the power generated by the photovoltaic modules;
P
(w)
i : the power generated by the small wind turbine;
P
(cl)




i : the power consumed by the non-controllable loads.



















i ) · τ (6)
2.4 Optimization constraints
The electrical system considered operates over time under several constraints related
to physical, modeling, comfort and electricity markets considerations.
2.4.1 Physical constraints
The storage system is constrained by its maximum capacity and its charging and
discharging rates:
∀t ∈ D, 0 ≤ E(t) ≤ Emax (7)
∀t1, t2 ∈ D, −Rd ≤ E(t2)− E(t1) ≤ Rc (8)
For the time subdivision d, the corresponding constraints (9), (10), (11), and (12)
are derived from (6), (7) and (8).
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The HVAC system is constrained by its thermal capacity. Assume that the maxi-
mum quantity of heat that can be either transferred to or removed from the room is
P h,max > 0 in absolute value. Then,
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, |P hi | < P h,max (13)
Additionally, T r is a continuous function, therefore T ri is continuous and the con-
tinuity at the boundary between di and di+1 gives:
T ri (τ) = T
r,0
i+1 (14)
Expressing T ri (τ) with (5), we obtain the following condition:
T r,0i Kτ − T
r,0




Mair · c ·Req
) (16)
The stand-alone genset is limited by its generation capacity P gs,max:
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, P (gs)i < P gs,max (17)
Finally, the amount of power that can be transferred from the distribution grid
to the home grid is limited by the line capacity P g,max > 0 at the point of common
coupling (PCC):
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, |P (g)i | < P g,max (18)
2.4.2 Modeling constraints
The number of times each non-interruptible appliance is to be scheduled over D is















Position i+ 1 Position i+ (kL − 1)
Figure 2.2: Non-overlapping conditions for each appliance
In addition, the same appliance cannot be scheduled more than once per time
interval, which means that two cycles cannot overlap (Fig. 2.2). Therefore we must
have:
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., SL − (kL − 1)},












If i = SL − (kL − 2),












If i = SL − (kL − 3),













If i = SL − (kL − (kL − 1)) = SL − 1,
1 condition
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2.4.3 Comfort preference constraints
The consumer’s comfort preferences on T r over D are transposed into two limit func-
tions T r,min and T r,max defined on D and discretized according to the subdivision
d.





Additionally, based on the consumer’s comfort preferences regarding each control-
lable, non-interruptible load L, a set of positions ΩL over which load L cannot be
functioning is defined:
∀j ∈ ΩL, δLj = 0 (22)
2.4.4 Electricity market constraints
In the following we assume that residential consumers can engage in energy trans-
actions with µ different electricity providers, µ > 1. For each interval di, define as
P
(g,k,+)
i > 0 the power delivered by provider k to the residential consumer at the point
of common coupling (PCC). Similarly, define as P
(g,k,−)
i > 0 the power delivered by
the residential consumer to provider k at the PCC. Define as Pk,+ and Pk,− the price
vectors at which provider k offers to sell and buy electricity over D, respectively. In
the following, we assume that Pk,+ and Pk,− come with a cap P k,+,max and P k,−,max,
respectively. These correspond to the maximum amount of power that provider k
is willing to buy or sell at the proposed prices. These two caps reflect the limited
transmission capabilities of the distribution grid as well as other network contingen-
cies that provider k must account for when formulating his offer. We assume that the
same caps apply to every interval di. Therefore, we must have:
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, P (g,k,+)i < P g,+,max (23)
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, P (g,k,−)i < P g,−,max (24)
Provider k may transmit several price vectors corresponding to several options
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regarding the cap values, the variations in the cap values being reflected in the prices.
Additionally, multiple price signals may also be used to differentiate offers based on
emission levels. In this last case, a subset of price vectors is defined according to the
consumer’s environmental preferences. Only those price vectors are later considered
when solving the optimization problem.
2.5 Problem formulation and optimization
2.5.1 Problem formulation and method of solution
Based on the set of constraints presented in Section 2.4, we formulate the power
scheduling problem over as a mixedinteger linear programming (MILP) problem [119]
which can be efficiently solved using GUROBI.
The (2µ+ 4)N +
∑`
i=1 SLi + 1 unknowns consists of the amounts of power bought
from and sold to each provider, the power generated by the genset over time, the
binary numbers representing the scheduling positions of each appliance, the room
temperature at the beginning of each interval di, and the power consumed by the
HVAC in the cooling and heating modes. The objective function C is defined as the
total electricity cost and is to be minimized over the time period considered.
In the following, we assume that each provider provides a quadruplet (Pk,+,
P k,+,max, Pk,−, P k,−,max) with P k,+,max = P k,−,max = P g,max. Additionally, we also
assume that each provider offers to scale Pk,+ logarithmically if the consumer agrees
to reduce the power cap. For κ ∈ [0, 1], the scaling factor corresponding to a power
cap κ · P k,+,max is defined as log(κP k,+,max)/log(P k,+,max). This pricing mechanism
reflects the willingness of each provider to encourage residential consumers to smooth
their energy consumption as much as possible over time. This corresponds to a peak-
to-average ratio (PAR) decreasing towards 1.
The MILP problem is solved for several values of κ using a divide and conquer
algorithm in order to approach the power cap that minimizes C. If µ > 1, in order to
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Algorithm 1: Decision making process on the residential consumer side under
the proposed problem formulation
1: Solve MILP problem for initial caps P 1,+,max, ..., P µ,+,max (κ = 1)
2: while (BestCost−NewCost) < ε
3: Set BestCost , NewCost)
4: Solve MILP problem for a different value of κ using divide and conquer algorithm
5: end while
simplify the search process, we approach the optimal cap by assuming that the same
κ applies to all providers, i.e. the power caps are the same for all providers.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the proposed decision making process on the residential
consumer side to determine the optimal energy consumption schedule over D.
2.5.2 Uncertainty on forecasted inputs
Errors on weather forecast and non-controllable consumption forecasts affect the fi-
nal value of the objective function. Complex forecasting algorithms for wind, solar
and non-controllable consumption are outside of the scope of this chapter. There-
fore, we assume in the following that the forecast errors on the solar irradiance and
non-controllable consumption follow normal distributions. The case below does not
consider wind, but wind power could also be modeled, including complex error distri-
butions [51]. As the industry moves towards better forecasting, the outcomes of the
proposed optimization tool will be further enhanced.
We follow a robust optimization approach to decrease the uncertainty on fore-
casted inputs at an acceptable computational cost. For the solar irradiance forecast,
we take the lower limit of the 95% confidence interval over D. Note that the stan-
dard error of the irradiance forecast can be modeled as a polynomial function of the
clear sky index and the cosine of the solar zenith angle [90]. For the non-controllable
consumption, we take the upper limit function of the 95% confidence interval. The
performance of this robust approach is further discussed in Section VII.
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Table 2.1: Values of physical constraints
Symbol Quantity Assumed value
P g,max Line capacity at PCC 20kW
Einit Energy stored at t=0 0kWh
Emax Maximum capacity, ESS 25kWh
Rc, Rd Max. charging/discharging rates, ESS 6kW
P h,max Max. quantity of heat exchanged 20kWe
between room and HVAC
P gs,max Max. power output, solar pamels 9kWp
2.5.3 Example
We simulate a summer time scenario involving µ = 3 energy providers, with ` =
6 interruptible loads. We set D = 24h, τ ′ = 5min and τ = 2.5min. Detailed
consumption profiles with a 1.5 min resolution are available for the washing machine,
dryer, dishwasher and defrost cycle of the fridge. These profiles are re-sampled with a
time step equal to τ . Average power consumptions are available for the water heater
and the PHEV battery.
Additionally, this example includes an ESS and a solar panel. Table 2.1 shows
the characteristic parameters assumed.
For the non-controllable consumption forecast, we assume the 95% confidence
limits to be at 20% of the expected value. This assumption is further discussed in
Section 2.7. The expected value and standard error functions of the solar irradiance
are hourly predictions derived from actual data [90].
The price signals used for the example were taken from actual day-ahead price
signals from PJM wholesale market scaled to reflect an average price of 12 /kWh.
We assume that the user has defined the following comfort preferences: room
temperature to remain between 20◦C and 25◦C at all times; dishwasher, washing
machine and dryer to run each once between 8:00am and 6:00pm; defrost cycle of the
fridge to run once over the next 24 hours; water heater cycle to run twice over the
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next 24hours; PHEV battery to charge 8 times 15min between 24:00am and 24:00pm.
Algorithm 1 returns the optimal schedule corresponding to a minimized cost of
0.59, with κ = 4.3%. The defrost mode starts at 10:50pm; the dishwasher starts
at 9:10am; the washing machine starts at 10:20am; the dryer starts at 12:10pm; the
water heater starts at 11:30 and 11:45pm; the PHEV battery charges continuously
from 6:10am to 8:10am. Fig. 2.4 gives the optimal schedule of the HVAC; the room
temperature remains within the comfort limits (Fig. 2.3). Fig. 2.5 gives the optimal
schedule of the ESS. The ESS is empty at the end of D: this is consistent with the
fact that the end-user wants to maximize his benefits over D.
The pricing mechanism is successful in encouraging the user to schedule its con-
trollable loads as well as its ESS in such a way that the net power exchanged with
each provider is mostly flat (Fig. 2.6).
Figure 2.3: Evolution of room temperature over D
2.6 Definition of a reference case
In order to evaluate the performance of Algorithm 1, we define a reference case where
residential users have limited decision making capabilities to optimize their energy
usage.
Under the reference case, each controllable, non-interruptible appliance which is
to run over D is started randomly within the user’s comfort preferences defined by ΩL.
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Figure 2.4: Optimal HVAC consumption schedule over D
Figure 2.5: Optimal ESS charging status over D
The HVAC has a cooling mode and a heating mode. We assume that the quantity
of heat exchanged with the room for each mode is fixed when the HVAC is on. At
the beginning of each interval, if the room temperature is outside of the comfort
preference constraints, the HVAC switches on to the corresponding mode.
If µ > 1, we assume that for each interval di a very basic algorithm is able to
select the providers offering to sell electricity at the lowest price, and to buy at the
highest price.
If a ESS is present, when the lowest selling price is below (respectively: above) a
given threshold, the ESS charges (respectively: discharges) at the highest rate possible
enforcing the ESS physical constraints as well as the power transfer constraints at the
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Figure 2.6: Power exchange with providers at PCC over D
PCC.
If a genset is present, whenever the net energy consumption of the house is positive,
if running the genset is less expensive than the lowest selling price, the genset covers
as much of the house power consumption as possible. If the genset has not reached
its maximum capacity yet, if running the genset costs less than the highest buying
price, the genset sells as much power as possible to the grid within power transfer
constraints at the PCC.
Algorithm 2 summarizes the decision making process on the residential consumer
side under the reference case.
2.7 Performance evaluation
In this section, we define several simulation scenarios, discuss simulation results, and
assess the performance of our proposed algorithm.
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Algorithm 2: Emulation of the decision making process on the
residential consumer side under the reference case
1: schedule appliances randomly over D within comfort constraints
2: for i = 1..N
3: if µ > 1
4: select best buying and selling providers
5: end if
6: if T r,0i outside of comfort preference constraints
7: start HVAC accordingly
8: end if
9: if best selling price < ESS price threshold
10: charge at the highest rate prossible
11: else
12: discharge at the highest rate possible
13: end if
14: if power transferred from the grid to the house > 0
15: if genset less expensive than providers
16: start genset to cover as much of the house consumption as possible
17: end if
18: if best buying price > cost to run genset






A simulation scenario is defined by a given home grid configuration, an algorithm
(proposed or reference method), and a number of providers. When the reference
method is used, results are averaged over a large number of simulations to account
for the random distribution of appliances.
Under the reference case, the price signals considered can be either day-ahead
prices (referred subsequently as the R-DA case) or real-time prices (R-RT case),
depending on the existence of a real-time market at the retail level. In addition to
the objective function C, the peak-to-average ratio (PAR) is also computed for each
scenario considered.
All the scenarios are computed for D=24 hours starting at midnight, with τ ′ =
5min and τ = 2.5min. The characteristics of the home grid components and the
comfort preferences are identical to those used in the example of Section 2.5. The
price signals used are taken from actual price signals from PJM wholesale market and
scaled.
When electricity price signals are flat, residential consumers have no incentive
to shift their demand consumption overtime. However, for comparison purposes, we
computed the flat price scenario for a home grid consisting of controllable and non-
controllable loads only (and with µ = 1 ). Under the reference case, C = $12.38
with day-ahead prices, and C = $14.75 with real-time prices, with PAR = 4.20 in
both cases. Under the optimized case, C = $12.16 with PAR = 2.07. The significant
reduction in the PAR reflects the presence of consumption spikes under the reference
case due to the dumb control strategy of the HVAC.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present simulation results for scenarios involving dynamic price
signals. The technology capabilities are incrementally increased, starting with load
scheduling only, and then adding successively the ESS, the ability to sell electricity
at the PCC, and the ability to generate electricity (solar panels, and finally genset).
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C($) PAR C($) PAR C($) PAR
Load scheduling 18.29 4.19 14.86 4.18 13.11 2.07
+ESS 16.67 3.75 13.61 4.17 10.39 1.18
+Ability to sell 16.79 3.49 13.28 3.78 10.18 1.00
+Solar panels 7.38 4.25 6.98 4.69 4.55 1.00
+Genset 5.02 4.54 6.82 5.18 4.40 1.00










C($) PAR C($) PAR C($) PAR
Load scheduling 14.35 4.18 14.17 4.18 12.78 1.55
+ESS 13.50 3.49 13.02 4.11 10.26 1.41
+Ability to sell 13.48 3.49 11.52 3.70 6.23 1.02
+Solar panels 4.39 4.29 6.43 4.66 0.59 1.01
+Genset 2.53 5.18 6.22 5.19 0.42 1.01
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2.7.2 Computational performance
Simulations were run on an Intel Xeon 4-core processor at 2.53 GHz with 6 GB
of memory. The average running time of the proposed algorithm for the scenarios
presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 was 231.8 seconds, with a maximum at 414.9 seconds.
From a practical implementation standpoint, the algorithm could be run either locally,
assuming the presence of a good solver, or by third parties providing computational
capabilities to the residential consumer. Access of energy usage information by third
parties is explicitly considered in [151].
2.7.3 Economic gains of users
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show that, for a given technology portfolio, the proposed algorithm
always outperforms the reference case.
In the basic scenario with the user limited to scheduling controllable loads, the
economic gain varies from 9.8% (µ = 3, against R-DA case) to 28.3% (µ = 1, against
R-RT case). In presence of the ESS, the proposed method improves the objective
function by 21.2% to 37.7%. If the consumer also has the ability to sell power at
the PCC, the proposed method outperforms the reference case by 23.3% to 53.8%.
Finally, if the solar panel is also connected to the home grid, the proposed method
outperforms the reference case by 34.9% to 86.6%.
Note that the R-RT and R-DA scenarios limited to load scheduling capabilities
always lead to higher bills than the corresponding flat price scenario previously dis-
cussed. This illustrates suboptimal energy utilization when residential customers are
to deal with dynamic pricing environments not equipped with the proper decision
tools.
2.7.4 Comparison with perfect forecasts
The proposed method reduces uncertainty by considering conservative non-controllable
consumption and power generation forecasts (robust approach). If the user follows
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Load scheduling 13.11 12.69 0.42 3.32
+ESS 10.39 9.93 0.45 4.56
+Ability to sell 10.18 9.69 0.48 4.99
+Solar panels 4.55 2.55 2.00 78.47
+Genset 4.40 2.37 2.03 116.75
the optimal schedule returned by the proposed algorithm, there is a high probability
that the actual value of the cost function will be equal or less than the value returned
by the algorithm. Because the non-controllable loads will probably consume less than
the upper limit of the 95% confidence interval, and the solar panels will probably pro-
duce more than the lower limit, the user will probably end up with more energy than
needed. This energy can be either stored or sold in the electricity market.
Table 2.4 compares (for µ = 1) our robust approach with the case where the
perfect forecasts would be known ahead of time.
The objective function returned is always over-estimated compared to the perfect
case, especially when solar panels start being considered. Still, the proposed approach
is always outperforming the reference case at approaching the perfect forecast (Table
2.2).
2.7.5 Sensitivity analysis on the confidence intervals of the non- control-
lable consumption forecast
We previously assumed the 95% confidence intervals of the non-controllable consump-
tion forecast to be at +/- 20% of the expected value. Table 2.5 shows the impact
on C of wider confidence intervals. The maximum variation observed in Table 2.5 is
+$2.01, but the variation remains below +$0.95 for 95% confidence limits at up to
+/- 60% of the expected value.
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Table 2.5: Impact on the objective function of wider confidence intervals for the
non-controllable consumption forecast (µ = 1)
Technology
C ($) for 95% confidence limits at
+/-X% of the expected value
X = 20
(reference)
X = 40 X = 60 X = 80 X = 100
Load scheduling 13.11 13.57 14.00 14.41 14.86
+ESS 10.39 10.80 11.24 11.62 12.01
+Ability to sell 10.18 10.64 11.13 11.27 11.72
+Solar panels 4.55 5.03 5.48 6.04 6.56
+Genset 4.40 4.86 5.30 5.74 6.19
2.7.6 Performance gains of providers
In the reference case, we observe that PARs decrease when the ESS is considered, but
re-increases when the distributed generation is put online. This reflects the fact that
the average power transferred from the grid to the house decreases because of the
local generation. The proposed algorithm significantly reduces the PAR compared
to the R-RT and R-DA cases (up to 80%). This reduction can be explained by the
better control scheme of the HVAC system, and by the pricing mechanism which
encourages the user to smooth the quantities of power bought from the provider(s)
by distributing the controllable loads over time and/or using the ESS to smooth the
demand curve.
2.8 Conclusions
New technology, legislation, and pricing policy are currently being developed and im-
plemented on residential electricity markets to enable increased customer participation–
one of the objectives of the future grid.
This chapter argues that advanced modeling of residential electricity consumers
and an intelligent optimizing algorithm are required to fully achieve the benefits ex-
pected from their increased participation. Providing only consumption and/or pricing
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information to the residential electricity consumer and leaving the complex scheduling
problem to the consumer will result in highly sub-optimal energy utilization.
The proposed modeling framework based on mixed-integer linear programming is
presented from a consumer’s perspective. The home energy controller derived from
this formulation is able to control the various home grid components in order to
optimize the household energy use based on the consumer’s preferences. This leads
to significant economic savings for the consumer compared to the reference case, as
well as lower PARs.
Demand response and demand curve flattening achieved by the proposed system
will benefit the provider too, by providing an upstream mechanism for reduction or
delay in generation reserve and capacity build out.
As the industry moves towards better wind, solar and noncontrollable consump-
tion forecasting, the outcomes of the proposed optimization tool will be further en-
hanced.
The formulation presented in this chapter can be extended to address real-time
demand response at the consumer level. The running times observed would allow
for efficiently responding to incentive signals sent every 15 minutes, supporting the
implementation of the proposed algorithm.
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CHAPTER III
OPTIMAL PRICING ALGORITHM FOR RESIDENTIAL




Electrical grids are evolving from vertically-integrated physical systems to complex
networks of autonomous prosumers exchanging energy and information with each
other. Prosumers are cyber-physical systems that can simultaneously manage gener-
ation, consumption, storage, and/or transmission assets at various spatial and tem-
poral scales [55, 54].
Residential prosumers in particular have gained much attention in recent years as
new technology is being deployed downstream of the meter. This includes controllable
appliances, distributed generation, storage systems, and scheduling algorithms that
can optimize energy utilization in response to dynamic price signals. Residential end-
users are becoming active energy players that can collectively impact the operation
of the grid through their local decisions.
In this context, electricity providers need to update their models to accurately
capture the new internal dynamics of residential end-users. These updated models
will allow providers to quantify the value of the end-users’ new capabilities to the
grid, and better understand how end-users behave when exposed to dynamic price
signals.
Under current industry practices, electricity providers typically consider residen-
tial demand as an exogenous input to the economic dispatch. Additionally, when
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time-varying pricing policies are in place, price-responsiveness of residential end-users
is often modeled as a memoryless function of the price.
The inherent dynamics induced by storage and load-shifting capabilities will soon
render this modeling approach obsolete. Access to storage and the possibility to
defer flexible loads induce an internal state –or memory– in the end-user model [39,
127]. This state corresponds to the amount of backlogged or stored energy; it evolves
dynamically over time and depends on the history –and when available, forecast– of
electricity prices.
Additionally, home energy management systems [68, 69] enable residential end-
users to pursue their own, local objectives (e.g. minimizing energy costs) while elec-
tricity providers and system operators continue to pursue distinct, system-level ob-
jectives (e.g minimizing generation costs or enforcing system constraints). In this
paradigm shift, dynamic electricity prices are becoming an important means of coor-
dinating the autonomous behavior of residential end-users to the benefit of the overall
system.
This chapter proposes a pricing algorithm that captures the end-users’ internal
dynamics and ensures that, when end-users autonomously optimize their local ob-
jectives in response to dynamic prices, they concurrently contribute to optimize the
system’s objective.
3.1.2 Existing work
The related work in the literature can be classified into two separate groups. A first
thread of research focuses on developing energy optimization algorithms to be em-
bedded in home energy management systems. These algorithms aim to select the
best energy schedule in response to an exogenous price signal –either given or pre-
dicted. Various techniques have been used to formulate the underlying optimization
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problem including mixed-integer linear programming [70, 26], particle swarm opti-
mization [57], stochastic optimization [170], optimal stopping rules [169], and genetic
algorithms [174].
A second thread of research, closer to our approach in this chapter, focuses on
selecting optimal pricing strategies for demand response in residential electricity mar-
kets [91, 24, 168, 80, 23, 123, 92, 99, 130, 88, 47, 81]. Studies in this second group can
be compared with each other and with this chapter across several dimensions (Table
3.1):
3.1.2.1 Temporality
The time horizon considered varies from one to several consecutive time periods. Some
authors propose to solve the optimization problem independently for each time slot
[24, 168, 23, 92, 130]. Others, including this chapter, account for temporal correlations
in the form of initial conditions (modeling past history) and intertemporal constraints
(modeling storage and/or load-shifting capabilities) [91, 80, 123, 99, 88, 47, 81].
3.1.2.2 Characteristics of end-user model
A large majority of studies use the concept of utility from microeconomics to model
the end-user behavior [91, 24, 168, 80, 23, 123, 92, 130, 88, 47, 81]. Although this ap-
proach provides valuable theoretical insights, its practical relevance is limited as utility
functions are not empirically observable (e.g. [126]). Aggregating utility functions
across distinct end-users also raises further theoretical concerns. For these reasons,
we choose to not use utility functions in this chapter. Some studies, including ours,
include specific constraints to model load-shifting capabilities [80, 123, 99, 88, 47].
Additionally, we explicitly model storage, distributed generation, and the ability to















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































At the local level, most authors assume that end-users maximize their economic
surplus [91, 24, 168, 80, 23, 123, 130, 88, 47, 81]. Utility maximization [92] and
cost minimization [99] are sometimes considered. At the system level, social welfare
maximization [91, 168, 80, 130, 88, 47, 81] and profit maximization [24, 80, 23, 123,
92, 99] are the two most common objectives assumed. In this chapter, we assume that
the provider and end-users aim to minimize their respective costs. Cost minimization
is the current industry standard when solving the economic dispatch.
3.1.2.4 Modeling framework
A first set of studies [91, 24, 168, 80, 23, 123, 92, 99], including this chapter, frame the
pricing problem as a Stackelberg game where the provider plays the role of leader, and
end-users play roles of followers. For every pricing strategy selected by the provider,
each end-user determines his optimal consumption strategy. A second set of studies
[130, 88, 47, 81] adopt a network utility maximization (NUM) approach and use dual
decomposition to compute the optimal prices as a by-product.
3.1.2.5 Information structure
Many studies including this chapter assume that the provider has full knowledge of
the end-users optimization problems (including their payoff functions) [91, 24, 168,
80]. We refer to this situation as complete information. The extensive literature on
non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM) supports this assumption. NILM algorithms
can determine the operating schedules of individual devices based on analysis of the
current and voltage measured at the eletricity meter. This includes transient and
steady-state analysis in the time and frequency domains (e.g. [107, 171, 32, 89]). On




The pricing algorithms developed in existing works separate into iterative and non-
iterative. Non-iterative solutions use backward induction and require closed-form
expressions of the end-user’s payoff functions [91, 24, 168, 80]. Iterative solutions
use gradient methods [23, 92, 130, 88, 47, 81] (NUM approach), or genetic [99] or
simulated annealing [123] algorithms (Stackelberg approach) to guide the price search.
Iterative methods do not require complete information, but involve asynchronous
message passing between the provider and end-users at each iteration. In general,
iterative methods might also not always converge. A recent study emulates the end-
users’ response centrally to avoid physical message passing, but requires complete
information [131]. In this chapter, we adopt a non-iterative approach. However,
contrary to the studies using backward induction, we develop a novel method using
inverse convex optimization. Discussion and comparison with related work in the
inverse optimization literature can be found in Section 3.5.1.
Finally, although a majority of the studies that we reviewed assume a single
electricity provider (including this chapter), some authors consider more complex
cases with several providers [92, 81].
3.1.3 Summary of contributions
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We propose an optimization model that captures the emerging flexible con-
sumption, storage, and generation capabilities of residential end-users as well
as the ability to buy from and sell electricity to the provider. Existing models
are usually limited to flexible consumption and do not account for bidirectional
power flows.
• In particular, for any given end-user, we provide a sufficient constraint that
allows modelling an arbitrary number of flexible loads with only one decision
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variable per time period. Existing models require one variable per time period
per flexible load.
• We propose an economic dispatch model that explicitly accounts for end-users’
internal dynamics. Existing models treat residential demand as an exogenous
input. We propose to solve this enhanced economic dispatch in a distributed
way using multi-level primal decomposition to both reduce the size of the prob-
lem and increase end-user privacy protection. To this end, we aggregate and
disaggregate consumption, storage and generation capabilities across clusters of
residential end-users.
• We propose a non-iterative pricing algorithm using convex programming and
inverse linear programming. Different from existing non-iterative algorithms,
our approach does not use backward induction and does not require closed-
form expressions. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first practical
application of inverse linear programming.
• We ensure fairness in billing each end-user according to his contribution towards
minimizing the provider’s generation costs. Existing studies aim to select a
pricing scheme that achieves optimality, but do not address the issue of fairness.
• We present extensive results obtained for two test cases based on historical
data that demonstrate the proposed approach. Most existing studies present
simulation results for test cases using synthetic data for the end-users.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce
mathematical formulations for basic energy functions that we subsequently use to
model the end-user- and provider-controlled assets. In Section 3.3, we formulate the
provider and end-user energy optimization problems. In Section 3.4, we develop a
framework to solve the enhanced economic dispatch problem in a decentralized way.
38
Section 3.5 is the core of the chapter: building on the inverse optimization literature,
we develop a theoretical framework to select electricity prices that incentivize resi-
dential end-users to adopt power schedules that benefit the operation of the overall
system. The issue of fairness is addressed in Section 3.6, and numerical results are
presented in Section 3.7.
3.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce models for three basic energy functions: controllable
generation, energy storage and flexible consumption. These models will serve as
building blocks to formulate the provider and end-user optimization problems.
3.2.1 System definition: space and time
Consider a dispatch area A operated by a single electricity provider. Within A,
the provider operates power generators indexed by i ∈ I, large-scale energy storage
systems indexed by l ∈ L, and exchanges electricity with residential end-users indexed
by j ∈ J . The provider is also in charge of maintaining power balance in A.
Continuous time is approximated as T+1 consecutive time periods t. Time period
0 ends at time 0; it is used to provide information about the starting configuration
of the system. The power planning and electricity pricing is done for time periods
1 through T . Let T , {1, ..., T} be the time horizon. Within each time period, all
power generation, charging, discharging, delivery, usage, and prices do not vary.
3.2.2 Controllable generation
Consider a controllable generator i. For each time period t, the operating cost is
modeled as a convex piecewise-linear function fi,t of the generator power output
(Fig.3.1); fi,t reflects primarily the fuel cost necessary to produce electrical energy,
but may also reflect other costs (regulatory, environmental, etc.). We call power
production levels k ∈ {1, 2, ..., Ki,t} the breakpoints in fi,t, with Ki,t the number of
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breakpoints. The locations and number of breakpoints are specific to each generator.
Let ai,k,t be the cost of running generator i at power level k during time period t, and
let bi,k,t be the amount of electric energy produced by generator i if run at power level k
during period t. By convention, bi,0,t represents the minimum-run production required
to maintain generator i online during time t, and ai,0,t represents the corresponding
cost.
Denote by Ci,t the operating cost, Pi,t the power output, and Mi,t the operating
point during time period t:








Mi,t , (Ci,t, Pi,t)
where variable wi,k,t denotes how much generator i is using of electricity productivity
from level k − 1 to k during time period t. If generator i runs at power level k or
higher during time period t, then wi,k,t = 1. If generator i runs at power level k−1 or
lower during period t, then wi,k,t = 0 . Otherwise, wi,k,t is such that Pi,t is equal to the
power output for generator i during time period t. The initial generation condition
is:
wi,k,0 = Wi,k,0 : 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki,0 (25)
where {Wi,k,0}1≤k≤Ki,0 are the initial production levels at time 0. Additionally, gen-
erator i can use from 0% to 100% of each of its power level slot:
0 ≤ wi,k,t ≤ 1 : 1 ≤ t ≤ T ; 1 ≤ k ≤ Ki,t (26)
Note that the proposition {∀t,∀k0, if wi,k0,t < 1, then ∀k ∈ {k0 + 1, ..., Ki,t}, wi,k,t =




















Figure 3.1: Example of generator cost function fi,t and operating point Mi,t with
Ki = 3, wi,1,t = 1, wi,2,t = 0.5, wi,3,t = 0.
The values of bi,0,t and bi,Ki,t,t reflect the minimum and maximum generation levels
for generator i during each time period t. We also consider the following changeover
limits:
Pi,t − Pi,t−1 ≤ βmaxi,t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T (27)
Pi,t − Pi,t−1 ≥ −βmini,t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T (28)
where βmaxi,t > 0 (resp. β
min
i,t > 0) is the upper bound (resp. lower bound) on the
change in power output from the beginning of period t− 1 to the beginning of period
t.
3.2.3 Energy storage
Consider an energy storage system l. Denote by sl,t the amount of energy stored at
the end of period t, cl,t the amount of energy charged during period t, and dl,t the





with s0l the initial amount of electric energy stored at the beginning of period 1. The
amount of energy stored must stay within the system capacity:
sminl,t ≤ sl,t ≤ smaxl,t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T (30)
where smaxl,t > 0 (resp. s
min
l,t > 0) is the maximum (resp. minimum) storage capacity
of storage system l at the end of period t. The charging and discharging rates must
also stay within the operational limits:
0 ≤ s+l,t ≤ s
max,+
l,t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T (31)
0 ≤ s−l,t ≤ s
max,−
l,t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T (32)
where smax,+l,t > 0 (resp. s
max,−
l,t > 0) is the maximum charging (resp. discharging)
rate for storage system l during time period t.
Finally, the amount of energy stored in storage system l evolves according to:
sl,t = ξl · sl,t−1 + ηl · s+l,t − s
−
l,t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T (33)
where ξl ≤ 1 is the decay factor and ηl ≤ 1 is the roundtrip efficiency factor for
storage system l. In general, the factors ξl and ηl are complicated functions of the
current storage level and past history of the system. In the following, we focus on an
ideal case where ξl = 1 and ηl = 1.
3.2.4 Flexible consumption
We first introduce a time-shiftable load model widely used in the recent demand
response literature to account for schedulable appliances operated by residential end-
users (e.g. [104, 26, 175, 168, 25]). Let Aj be the set of schedulable appliances oper-
ated by end-user j. Let yj,a , [yj,a,1, ..., yj,a,T ] be the energy consumption scheduling
vector for appliance a ∈ Aj where yj,a,t denotes the energy consumption scheduled
for a during time period t. Let yj , [yj,1, ..., yj,T ] be the overall consumption schedule
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for end-user j formed by stacking up schedules yj,a for all appliances a ∈ Aj. The set









yj,a,t = 0, ∀t ∈ T \Tj,a
0 ≤ yj,a,t ≤ γmaxj,a,t , ∀t ∈ Tj,a

where Ej,a is a pre-determined energy consumption requirement to be allocated to ap-
pliance a during Tj,a , {αj,a, ..., βj,a} ⊆ T with αj,a < βj,a, and γmaxj,a,t is the maximum
power level for appliance a during time period t. Some authors also include mini-
mum power level requirements for each appliance a ∈ Aj. In this chapter, we model
minimum power requirements as fixed consumption requirements. Similarly, the case
αj,a = βj,a is modeled as fixed consumption requirements using fixed parameters.
The number of decision variables yj,a,t required under this first approach may grow
rapidly if end-users operate multiple time-shiftable loads. For reasons discussed in
Section 3.5.4, we are interested in limiting the number of end-user variables as much
as possible. To this end, we propose an alternative formulation which aggregates
energy requirements accross time-shiftable loads while preserving feasibility. Under
our approach, for a given user j operating an arbitrary number of time-shiftable loads,
only the T variables yj,t are needed.
Let Ej,t1,t2 be the amount of energy required by end-user j from the beginning of
period t1 to the end of period t2, with t1 < t2. Ej,t1,t2 is only the requirement associ-
ated with time interval Tt1,t2 , {t1, .., t2}; it does not include requirements associated
with time intervals within or overlapping Tt1,t2 . Let Emaxj,t1,t2,t be the maximum amount
of energy that can be allocated during time period t ∈ Tt1,t2 to provide for Ej,t1,t2 .
For any (t1, t2) ∈ T 2 with t1 < t2, let Aj,t1,t2 ⊆ Aj be the set of appliances for
which αj,a = t1 and βj,a = t2. Using the notation above, we have the following
relations:
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∀(t1, t2) ∈ T 2 s.t. t1 < t2,
Ej,t1,t2 =

0 if Aj,t1,t2 ≡ ∅∑
a∈Aj,t1,t2
Ej,a else





For a given end-user j, for every time interval Tt1,t2 , the total amount of energy
consumed by j during Tt1,t2 is at least the total amount of energy that must be con-
sumed by j during that time interval. The latter is the sum of all energy requirements









Ej,t3,t4 : 1 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T (34)
It is obvious that constraints (34) are necessary for end-user j to satisfy his energy
requirements. It is not obvious, but it is true, that these constraints are also sufficient.
The proof is given in Appendix 3.9.




















with ∀t ∈ T , Ej,t,t = 0 by convention, and:














End-user ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Provider ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
3.3 Energy optimization problems
In this section, we formulate the optimization problem solved by end-users in response
to dynamic price signals. We also propose a formulation of the economic dispatch
problem that explicitly accounts for the end-users’ internal dynamics.
3.3.1 Residential end-users
The end-users’ usage requirements can be of two forms: non-controllable and control-
lable. Non-controllable usage requires certain amounts of electric power at fixed times
(e.g. minimal power requirements of appliances), and/or anytime during a certain pe-
riod of time but without prior notice (TV, microwave, lights, etc.). Non-controllable
usage cannot be scheduled. Let zj,t ≥ 0 be the fixed power requirement for end-user
j during time period t, and define zj , [zj,1, ..., zj,T ]. We assume that zj can be
estimated in advance using historical data.
Controllable usage is more flexible in that it requires, for each controllable load, a
certain amount of electrical energy (known in advance) during a certain time interval.
This energy can be provided to the load at anytime during that time interval. Con-
trollable loads are therefore schedulable (e.g. dishwasher, washing machine, dryer,
water heater, pool pump). Fexible requirements are modeled as shown in Section
3.2.4. In particular, yj,t denotes the amount of power used by end-user j during time
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period t to meet his flexible usage requirements.
End-users may have the ability to store energy locally. For each end-user j,






j,T ] the charging









j,t follow the model introduced in Section 3.2.3. Temporary storage
capabilities (e.g. battery electric vehicle connected to the end-user home grid) are
modeled by setting sj,t = 0 when not available (e.g. when vehicle is absent).
When residential end-users have the ability to generate electricity locally, their
generation capabilities are typically non-controllable (e.g.: small wind turbines, solar
panels). Let pj,t ≥ 0 be the amount of electric energy produced by end-user j during
time period t. We assume that pj,t can be estimated in advance using historical data
and weather forecast.
Finally, residential end-users have the ability to exchange energy with the provider.
The variables x+j,t and x
−
j,t denote the amounts of power purchased from and sold to
the provider by end-user j during time period t:
0 ≤ x+j,t ≤ x
max,+
j,t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T (36)
0 ≤ x−j,t ≤ x
max,−
j,t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T (37)
where xmax,+j,t > 0 and x
max,−
j,t > 0 are the upper and lower bounds on the amounts
of power that may be purchased and sold by end-user j during time period t. These
bounds reflect thermal limits at the point of common coupling, and possibly other
limits resulting from contractual terms with the provider.















j ] the exchange schedule, and ∆xj , x
+
j − x−j the net exchange schedule.




j ] the internal schedule for end-user j over T .
46
End-user j must balance his local energy usage for each time period t:
(yjt + zjt) + (s
+
j,t − s−j,t)− pj,t
= (x+j,t − x−j,t) : 1 ≤ t ≤ T (38)
In this chapter, we model residential end-users as cost minimizers. The end-
users’ goal is to select feasible consumption, storage, purchase and sale schedules
that minimize their energy costs over T . We formulate the underlying optimization












subject to Ajxj ≤ bj, xj ≥ 0
with:
• π+j,t > 0 : the price the provider offers to sell electricity to end-user j during t,
• π−j,t < 0 : the price the provider offers to purchase electricity from end-user j
during t,
• xj , (x̂j, ŷj) : the power schedule for end-user j’s assets,
• Pj , {xj ∈ Rm : Ajxj ≤ bj, xj ≥ 0} : the polytope defined by constraints
{(29)-(33), (35)-(38)}.
In other words, we assume that end-user j’s home energy management system
solves (P-j) to select the best energy schedule. The program (P-j) has m = 6T + 1
variables, and m′ = 0.5T 2 + 15.5T + 2 constraints.














j ). Also define
cj , (πj, 0, ..., 0) such that Ψj = cjxj.
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3.3.2 Electricity provider
The generators i ∈ I available for dispatch between time 0 and the end of period T
are modeled as shown in Section 3.2.2. In addition, let Gt > 0 be the non-controllable
generation injected into the electricity system within the boundaries of A during time
period t. This includes pre-committed production (bilateral contracts), reliability
must-run production and intermittent or must-take resources (solar, wind, run-of-
river hydro).
The large-scale storage systems l ∈ L operated by the provider are modeled as
shown in Section 3.2.3. For a given storage system l ∈ L, define Sl , [Sl,1, ..., Sl,T ]









l,T ] the discharging schedule over T .
The provider exchanges energy with end-users j ∈ J through the electricity net-
work. For simplicity, we model the network as a single infinite bus without losses.
Additionally, let Dt > 0 be the non-controllable demand during time period t, includ-
ing bilateral contracts with large industrial end-users.











(x+j,t − x−j,t) : 1 ≤ t ≤ T (39)
Under the standard economic dispatch approach, the provider selects feasible gen-
eration schedules that minimize generation costs while meeting the end-users demand
modeled as an exogenous input to the problem.
In this chapter, we initially assume that the end-users are working cooperatively
with the provider to optimize the provider’s objective over T ; we refer to the optimal
objective achieved as the team optimum. The corresponding optimization problem –
which we subsequently refer to as the enhanced economic dispatch or master problem–


















Figure 3.2: System modeling of the provider-controlled and prosumer-controlled as-








subject to Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0
with:
• x : the power schedule for both the provider-controlled, and prosumer-controlled
assets,
• PA , {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0} : the polytope defined by constraints {(25)-
(28)} (controllable generation, for all i ∈ I), {(29)-(33)} (large-scale storage,
for all l ∈ L), {(35)-(38)} (end-users-controlled assets, for all j ∈ J), and (39)
(network power balance).













In reality, end-users do not work cooperatively with the provider but instead
autonomously select their best strategy in response to dynamic price signals. Recall
that, similarly to [91, 24, 168, 80, 23, 123, 92, 99], we frame the pricing problem
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as a Stackelberg game where the provider plays the role of leader, and end-users
play roles of followers. For every pricing strategy selected by the provider, each
end-user determines his optimal consumption strategy. Since the sets of actions of
the provider (pricing schemes) and end-users (energy schedules) are compact, and
the payoff functions ΦA and Ψj are continuous, the Stackelberg equilibrium always
exists. The best solution the provider can possibly achieve in this Stackelberg game
is precisely the team optimum obtained when solving (MP).
The central part of the problem is then to choose a pricing scheme that induces
the end-users to behave cooperatively, and thus achieve the team optimum. More
precisely, denote by x? ∈ argminx{ΦA : Ax ≤ b} the optimal solution obtained
when solving (MP). For any pricing scheme πj, end-user j finds an optimal schedule
xIj ∈ argminx{Ψj : Ajxj ≤ bj}. The goal of the provider is to find a particular
πj such that end-user j can be induced to act cooperatively, i.e. select an energy
exchange schedule x̂Ij as close as possible to x̂
?
j to achieve the team optimum. Note
that the internal power schedule ŷIj does not directly impact the provider’s operations,
therefore ŷIj may differ from ŷ
?
j .
3.4 Multi-level decomposition of enhanced economic dis-
patch
In this section, we develop a method to solve the enhanced economic dispatch in a
distributed way using multi-level primal decomposition.
3.4.1 Hierachical control structure
Solving the master problem (MP) as formulated in Section 3.3.2 allows us to determine
in a single step the desired energy exchange schedules x̂?j for each residential end-user
–or prosumer– j ∈ J . This formulation corresponds to a flat representation of area
A (Fig. 3.3a).
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Three factors can motivate the decomposition of the master problem into dis-
tributed subproblems: computational cost, data size requirements, and end-user pri-
vacy. Solving (MP) can become computationally expensive as the size of PA in-
creases. In particular, the number of rows in A increases with T 2|J |, where |J | is
the number of residential prosumers in J . Decomposition allows for reducing the size
of PA through sequential data aggregation, which in turn reduces the amount of
data eventually transfered to the central operator. Data aggregation also increases
end-user privacy protection.
In practice, we propose to decompose the master problem (MP) into distributed
subproblems (SP-x) modeling nested super-prosumers (Fig. 3.3b). A super-prosumer
x is a virtual prosumer formed by aggregating the consumption, production and
storage capabilities of other prosumers. These capabilities are placed under a single
objective function. This operation can be repeated, and the capabilities of several
super-prosumers can be aggregated to form a new, larger super-prosumer.
The resulting control structure is a multi-level hierarchical tree where distributed
problems are coordinated by other distributed problems at the above level, and even-
tually by the master problem (Fig. 3.3c). The master problem can be decomposed
arbitrarily, or following the network topology of area A (transformers, substations,
etc.). In the later case, the actual computation may be distributed, each (SP-x) be-
ing solved locally and their output passed down to the next level, or centralized, all
(SP-x) being solved at the same node.
3.4.2 Aggregation of prosumers
Let Jx be the set of prosumers aggregated to form super-prosumer x. Super-prosumers
are prosumers, and can therefore be modeled using the same parameters and variables.
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(c) Hierarchical control structure for dispatch area A
Figure 3.3: Multi-level decomposition of master problem (MP) into subproblems (SP-
x) and prosumer problems (P-j) with N = 3 for dispatch area A
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time period t, Ex,t1,t2 the amount of energy required by x from the beginning of period
t1 to the end of period t2, and E
max
x,t1,t2,t
the maximum amount of energy that can be
allocated during any time period from the beginning of period t1 to the end of period




x,t the upper and lower
bounds on the amounts of energy that may be purchased and sold by super-prosumer
x.
Aggregating the production, consumption, and energy exchange parameters across




















xmax,−j,t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T
Aggregating storage capabilities across Jx while preserving feasibility is less straight-
forward as the charging and discharging rates may differ significantly from one storage
system to another. For this reason, we assume in the following that the storage vari-
ables and constraints are carried over to the upper level when aggregating.
Assuming an extreme case where the |J | initial prosumers would eventually be
aggregated into one unique super-prosumer at level 1, the matrix A would now have




t=0Ki,t variables (i.e. 3T (|J | − 1) less
than initially), and n′1 = (0.5T







t=1Ki,t constraints (i.e. (0.5T
2 + 7.5T )(|J | − 1) less than initially). When
|J | >> |I|, |L|, T (which we expect in practice) n1/n ≈ 50% and n′1/n′ ≈ 16/(T +31).
For T = 24, n′1/n
′ ≈ 29%, i.e. a reduction of the number of variables by 50%, and of
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the number of rows in A by 71%.
3.4.3 Propagation of control signals
The master problem (MP) assigns energy schedules x̂?x to each of the level-1 super-
prosumers (Fig. 3.3c). Each super-prosumer x subsequently determines the exchange







subject to Ajxj ≤ bj ∀j ∈ Jx
This process iterates until a desired power exchange schedule x̂?j has been assigned
to each residential prosumer j ∈ J .
3.5 Optimal pricing: theoretical framework
In this section, we propose a method to select the electricity prices πj such that each
prosumer j ∈ J responds with a power exchange schedule x̂Ij as close as possible to
x̂?j .
3.5.1 Related work
Setting the prices πj can be viewed as an inverse optimization problem. The “forward”
optimization problem (P-j) consists of finding a feasible power schedule xj such that
the objective Ψj = cjxj is optimal at xj. The corresponding inverse optimization
problem consists of finding a cost vector cj = (πj, 0, ..., 0) ∈ Rm that makes a given




j , and (P-j) is a
linear program.
Ahuja and Orlin developed a general approach to solve inverse linear programming
problems under the weighted L1 and L∞ norms (see [3]), building on earlier work
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by Zhang and Liu ([172], [173]). In these papers, inverse linear programming is
understood as minimally adjusting the cost coefficients of a linear program such that
a given feasible solution becomes an optimal solution under the new cost coefficient
values.
Our own approach differs in a number of ways. First, and contrary to what
the above references seem to suggest, it is worth noting that any feasible solution
cannot necessarily be made optimal. Indeed, only those feasible solutions that are
also on the surface (faces, edges, vertices) of the linear program’s feasible region –a
convex polytope– can be made optimal. Conversely, the feasible solutions located
in the interior of the polytope cannot be made optimal, unless one allows the cost
coefficients to be all zeros, which is of limited interest for practical applications. In
our particular case, this means that only those feasible power schedules xj that are
on the surface of Pj can possibly be made optimal.
Second, the general approach developed by Ahuja and Orlin does not consider the
case where all or part of the cost coefficients must verify some pre-specified constraints.





remaining cost coefficients must be set to zero. These zero cost coefficients correspond
to the prosumer’s internal storage and consumption variables that do not appear in
Ψj. Additionally, we must require that π
+
j,t be strictly positive, π
−
j,t be strictly negative,
π+j,t and |π−j,t| be less than or equal to some price cap πmax > 0, and that arbitrage is










∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∀t ∈ (1, T ),
0 < µt ≤ πmax
− πmax ≤ µt+T < 0
0 < (µt + µt+T )

with (et)1≤t≤m the canonical basis for Rm. On the other hand, while Ahuja and
Orlin’s approach seeks a new cost vector that remains as close as possible to some
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pre-specified cost vector, we do not have such a requirement in our particular case.
Third, for a given power schedule x0j , finding a cost vector c
0
j ∈ C such that
x0j ∈ argminxj{c0jxj : Ajxj ≤ bj}, that is, “making x0j optimal” in Ahuja and Orlin’s
terms, would not necessarily lead prosumer j to select x0j in response to cj because
of cases of multiple optima in the primal (faces of Pj). Instead, ideally, we would
like to find c0j ∈ C such that argminxj{c0jxj : Ajxj ≤ bj} = {x0j}, which is a stronger
requirement than in Ahuja and Orlin’s formulation.
Finally, while finding a cost vector c0j ∈ C such that argminxj{c0jxj : Ajxj ≤
bj} = {x?j} would satisfy the provider’s requirements, recall that the provider only
requires the energy exchange schedule x̂Ij selected by the end-user to be as close as
possible to x̂?j . Let x̂
?
j ∈ R2T be the subvector equal to the first 2T components of x?j .
In polyhedral terminology, (x̂?j , 0, ..., 0) ∈ Rm is the projection of x?j ∈ Rm onto the
lower dimensional space of interest to the provider. In the following, we simply say
for brevity that x̂?j is the projection of x
?
j .
3.5.2 Basic concepts: exposability, unique exposability
We begin by defining the following terms:
Definition 1. x0j ∈ Pj is exposable for (P-j) if and only if there exists c0j 6= 0 such
that x0j ∈ argminxj{c0jxj : Ajxj ≤ bj}. Such a c0j is said to expose x0j .
Definition 2. x0j ∈ Pj is uniquely exposable for (P-j) if and only if there exists c0j
such that argminxj{c0jxj : Ajxj ≤ bj} = {x0j}. Such a c0j is said to uniquely expose
x0j .
We also define terminology for situations where we impose constraints on c0j .
Definition 3. x0j ∈ Pj is C -exposable for (P-j) if and only if there exists c0j ∈ C
that exposes x0j .
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Definition 4. x0j ∈ Pj is uniquely C -exposable for (P-j) in the strong sense if and
only if there exists c0j ∈ C that uniquely exposes x0j . Such a c0j is said to uniquely
expose x0j in the strong sense.
We sometimes use the term Rm-exposable to mean exposable, to emphasize the
absence of constraints on c0j except c
0
j 6= 0. In Ahuja and Orlin’s terms, “to make
x0j an optimal solution” means “to make x
0
j Rm-exposable”. Similarly, “c0j is inverse




j” using our terminology.
By a well-known property of polyhedra, for c0j ∈ C to uniquely expose a given
x0j ∈Pj in the strong sense, x0j must be a vertex, or extreme point, of Pj. However,
in our problem, x?j is not necessarily an extreme point of Pj, in which case such c
0
j
simply does not exist. We need a strategy to deal with this case.
One strategy is to find an extreme point of Pj as close as possible to x?j , and
try to uniquely expose that point as an acceptable proxy. We show in Appendix 3.10
that, even when no constraints are placed on the cost vector (unique Rm-exposability),
finding an extreme point of a polyhedron closest to a given point is in general strongly
NP-complete. Since the provider is only concerned with the energy flows between
itself and the prosumers, we could seek to meet the following weaker property.
Definition 5. x0j ∈ Pj is uniquely C -exposable for (P-j) in the weak sense if and
only if there exists c0j ∈ C such that ∀x1j ∈ argminxj{c0jxj : Ajxj ≤ bj} it is true that
x̂1j = x̂
0
j . Such a c
0
j is said to uniquely expose x
0
j in the weak sense.
Since unique exposability in the weak sense is sufficient to meet the provider’s
requirements, another strategy is to seek an extreme point xIj whose projection x̂
I
j
onto the lower dimensional space is the same as x̂?j , the projection of x
?
j (Fig. 3.4).












Figure 3.4: Three-dimensional (arbitrary) representation of polytopes Pj and P̂j.
3.5.3 Overview of proposed approach
Intuitively, the linear constraints placed on the cost vector are relatively more strin-
gent in Rm than in the 2T -dimensional space of interest to the provider. This is
because the (m − 2T ) cost coefficients correponding to the prosumer’s internal vari-
ables must be set to zero in Rm while the constraints affecting the 2T prices remain the
same, making it possibly harder to achieve unique exposability in the full dimensional
space. Preliminary simulations on small test cases confirmed this intuition.
For this reason, we first tackle the inverse optimization problem in the lower
dimensional space. We calculate the projection of the end-user’s polytope Pj onto
the 2T -dimensional space of interest to the provider, and find an initial cost vector
using strong duality. This cost vector guides the search for a proxy extreme point
close to x̂?j . We then find a cost vector that uniquely exposes this proxy extreme point
in the lower dimensional space.
In a second phase, we return to the full dimensional space. We show that the































































































































































































Pj whose projection onto the lower dimensional space is the proxy point close to x̂?j
that we previously identified.
In a final phase, we conduct post-treament operations on the prices selected to
maintain some degree of fairness between the end-users. We also adjust the power
schedules for the provider-controlled assets based on the end-user schedules to be
uniquely exposed to ensure power balance is maintained within area A. Fig. 3.5
summarizes the proposed approach.
3.5.4 Computing the projection of Pj
Let P̂j ⊆ R2T be the projection of Pj onto the lower dimensional space of interest
to the provider:
P̂j , {x̂j ∈ R2T | ∃ŷj ∈ R(m−2T ), (x̂j, ŷj) ∈Pj}
In this section, we present the step-by-step process by which we successively eliminate




j,t, and yj,t from the known representation of Pj to obtain a
representation of P̂j, for any j ∈ J .
Recall that Pj is defined by the system of constraints {(29)-(33), (35)-(38)}.




(s+j,i − s−j,i) + s0j : 1 ≤ t ≤ T
s+j,t = x
+
j,t − x−j,t − yj,t − zj,t + s−j,t + pj,t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T
Eliminating sj,t and s
+
j,t from (30) and (31) using the expressions above, we obtain:




(x+j,i − x−j,i − yj,i − zj,i + pj,i) ≤ smaxj,t (40)
0 ≤ x+j,t − x−j,t − yj,t − zj,t + s−j,t + pj,t ≤ s
max,+
j,t (41)
Eliminating s−j,t from constraints (32) and (41) using the Fourier-Motzkin elimi-
nation method, we obtain:
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∀t ∈ (1, T ),
−x+jt + x−jt + yj,t + zj,t ≤ s
max,−
j,t + pj,t (42)
x+jt − x−jt − yj,t − zj,t ≤ s
max,+
j,t − pj,t (43)
Some of the time periods t ∈ T may not have flexible requirements. Therefore,
some of the yj,t variables may be unnecessary. Thus, let us first simplify the system
of constraints before eliminating the remaining yj,t using Fourier-Motzkin.
Consider a residential end-user j ∈ J . Let Fj,i = {aj,i, ..., bj,i} be the sets of
consecutive time periods with flexible consumption requirements indexed by i ∈ Fj,
with:
∀i ∈ Fj, (aj,i, bj,i) ∈ T 2
∀i ∈ {1, ..., |Fj| − 1}, aj,i < bj,i < bj,i + 1 < aj,i+1 < bj,i+1
The condition bj,i + 1 < aj,i+1 means that there is at least one time period without
flexible consumption requirements between two consecutive sets Fj,i and Fj,i+1.
For end-user j, define:
• τj,1 , T \
⋃
i∈Fj





Fj,i : the set of time periods t with flexible consumption requirements;
• τj,3 : the set of pairs (t1, t2) ∈ T 2 s.t. Ej,t1,t2 6= 0;




{aj,i+1, ..., bj,i} = τ2\τ4;
• τj,6 , {bj,1, bj,2, .., bj,|Fj |} : the set of last time periods for each Fj,i;
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Variables {yj,t}t∈τj,1 are unnecessary since no flexible consumption requirements
are specified for time periods in τj,1. Thus, we only keep variables {yj,t}t∈τj,2 . Addi-
tionally, the terms
∑t
i=1 yj,i in (40) lead us to define the following change of variable:
∀t ∈ τj,2, Yj,t ,
∑t
k=ai
yj,k where i ∈ Fj is such that t ∈ Fj,i.
With these new variables, constraints (35) become: ∀(t1, t2) ∈ τj,3,{
Yj,t2 ≥ Γj,t1,t2 if t1 = ai (44)
Yj,t2 − Yj,t1 ≥ Γj,t1,t2 else (45)
where i ∈ Fj is such that (t1, t2) ∈ F2j,i, and:
∀t ∈ τj,4, 0 ≤ Yj,t ≤ ymaxj,t (46)
∀t ∈ τj,5, 0 ≤ Yj,t − Yj,t−1 ≤ ymaxj,t (47)
Constraints (40) become:
∀t ∈ τj,1, sminj,t ≤
t∑
i=1







j ≤ smaxj,t (48)
∀t ∈ τj,2, sminj,t ≤
t∑
i=1





Yj,bi − Yj,t + s0j ≤ smaxj,t (49)
Constraints (42) become:
∀t ∈ τj,1,−x+jt + x−jt ≤ s
max,−
j,t − zj,t + pj,t (50)
∀t ∈ τj,4,−x+jt + x−jt + Yj,t ≤ s
max,−
j,t − zj,t + pj,t (51)
∀t ∈ τj,5,
− x+jt + x−jt + Yj,t − Yj,t−1 ≤ s
max,−
j,t − zj,t + pj,t (52)
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Constraints (43) become:
∀t ∈ τ1, x+jt − x−jt ≤ s
max,+
j,t − pj,t + zj,t (53)
∀t ∈ τ4, x+jt − x−jt − Yj,t ≤ s
max,+
j,t − pj,t + zj,t (54)
∀t ∈ τ5, x+jt − x−jt − Yj,t + Yj,t−1 ≤ α+j,t − pj,t + zj,t (55)
Constraints (36) and (37) remain unchanged.
In summary, we have replaced system {(29)-(33), (35)-(38)} defining Pj by system
{(36),(37), (44)-(55)}. The remaining variables in this new system are: x+j,t, x−j,t, and
Yj,t. Recall that we aim to compute an equivalent system with only the x
+
j,t and
x−j,t remaining. We then eliminate successively the Yj,t variables using the Fourier-
Motzkin elimination method (see for instance [133, pp.155-157]). The equivalent
system of inequalities obtained defines the projected polytope P̂j for any prosumer
j ∈ J .
Note that the Fourier-Motzkin elimination method is not polynomial and can be
quite time-consuming for problems in many variables. This motivated the formula-
tion that we proposed in Section 3.2.4 to model flexible consumption requirements
using only T decision variables at most. In practice, the computational capabilities
available may require to limit |τj,2|, the number of time intervals during which flexible
consumption can be scheduled.
We formulate the projected prosumer problem as follows:
(P̂-j)
minimize ĉjx̂j
subject to Âjx̂j ≤ b̂j, x̂j ≥ 0
with P̂j = {x̂j ∈ R2T : Âjx̂j ≤ b̂j}.
Finally, we denote by Ĉ the set of acceptable cost vectors in the lower dimensional
space:
Ĉ , {ĉj ∈ R2T |(ĉj, 0(m−2T )) ∈ C }
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3.5.5 Selecting an initial cost vector in Ĉ
As a first step, we are looking for a cost vector ĉ•j ∈ Ĉ and a feasible schedule x̂•j ∈ P̂j
as close as possible to x̂?j , which get close to meet the optimality conditions.
Observe that x̂0j ∈ argminx̂j{ĉ0jᵀx̂j : Âjx̂j ≤ b̂j, x̂j ≥ 0} if and only if there exist




j ≤ ĉ0j , γ0j ≤ 0






Ideally, we would like to find a cost vector in Ĉ that meets the optimality con-








j is feasible for the primal and x̂
0
j is feasible for the dual, we
replace (iii) by ĉ0j




j to improve feasibility, and try to keep ρ ≥ 1 as close
as possible to 1.
Define the following program:
(Ĥ-j)
minimize ‖x̂j − x̂?j‖
subject to Âjx̂j ≤ b̂j, x̂j ≥ 0 (primal)
Âᵀjγj ≤ ĉ0j , γj ≤ 0 (dual)
ĉᵀj x̂
?




We try to solve (Ĥ-j) for (x̂j, ĉj, γj) with ρ = 1, and if infeasible, increase ρ by




j ) the optimal solution
obtained.
3.5.6 Finding a proxy extreme point in P̂j
We now use ĉ•j to guide the search for a proxy extreme point x̂
I
j close to x̂
?
j . We solve
(P̂-j) with ĉ•j as the cost vector, and denote by x̂
◦
j the solution returned. All standard
LP software returns an extreme point solution, either by using the simplex algorithm
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or by performing a crossover after termination of an interior point algorithm.
3.5.7 Ensuring unique Ĉ -exposability in P̂j
By definition of x̂◦j , ĉ
•
j ∈ Ĉ exposes x̂◦j , but does not necessarily uniquely exposes x̂◦j .
We are looking for a ĉ◦j ∈ Ĉ that uniquely exposes x̂◦j for (P̂-j) in the strong sense.
Theorem 1. ĉ0j ∈ Ĉ uniquely exposes x̂0j ∈ P̂j in the strong sense if and only if x̂0j
is an extreme point of P̂j and ĉ0j can be expressed as a strictly positive sum of all
binding contraints at x̂0j .
Proof. We prove the theorem for the general case of a vector c that uniquely exposes
a point v in polyhedron P ⊂ Rn.
(⇐) Let Bx ≥ b be the set of constraints that define P and are binding at v. By
assumption, Bv = b and c = πTB for a vector π > 0. Since v is an extreme point of
P , v is a basic feasible solution and hence B contains n linearly independent rows.
Therefore v is the unique solution to Bv = b. Let w ∈ P and suppose πTBw ≡ c ·w ≤
c · v ≡ πTBv ≡ πT b. Apply π > 0 to Bw ≥ b to get πTBw = c · w ≥ πT b. Then
c ·w = c · v. If row i of B, denoted Bi·, were such that Bi·w > bi, then since πi > 0 we
would have πTBw > πT b, a contradiction. Therefore Bw = b which implies Bv = b.
Hence c uniquely exposes v in the strong sense.
(⇒) If c uniquely exposes v but is not an extreme point, then v = λp + (1− λ)q
for 0 < λ < 1, p ∈ P, q ∈ P, p 6= q and c · v < c · p and c · v < c · q. This contradicts
c · v = λc · p+ (1− λ)c · q. Therefore v is an extreme point. We now must show that
c = πTB for some vector π > 0 where B, b are as defined in the first part of the proof.
By contradiction , suppose no such π > 0 exists. This means that the system
αc = πTB; π ≥ 1;α ≥ 0, π ≥ 0
has no solution. By Farkas’s Lemma, there exist vectors y, w such that w ≥ 0, w 6=
0, w ≤ By, and c · y ≤ 0. Hence By ≥ 0 and y 6= 0. For sufficienty small ε > 0,
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the only constraints that define P which v + εy could violate are those at which v is
binding. For some such ε > 0, let v′ = v + εy. Then Bv′ = Bv + εBy ≥ Bv ≥ b, so
v′ ∈ P . Also, c · v′ = c · v + εc · y ≤ c · v. Since c uniquely exposes v, it must be that
v = v′. But this contradicts y 6= 0. completing the proof.
By theorem 1, we therefore select ĉ◦j ∈ Ĉ that can be expressed as a strictly
positive sum of all binding contraints at x̂◦j .
3.5.8 Returning to Pj, the higher dimensional space
Theorem 2. If ĉ◦j ∈ Ĉ uniquely exposes x̂◦j in the strong sense, c◦j = (ĉ◦j , 0, ..., 0) ∈ C
uniquely exposes x◦j in the weak sense.
Proof. First, filling out the vector ĉ◦j ∈ Ĉ with zeros makes the resulting vector c◦j
an element of C , because having those terms equal to 0 is precisely the additional
condition that must be satisfied for membership in C . Second, for the main part of
the proof, let x1j be an optimal solution to the problem of minimizing c
◦
j · x on the
higher dimensional polytope Pj. Following the definition of exposure in the weak
sense, we must prove that x̂1j = x̂
◦
j . By construction, for any (higher-dimensional)
point xj, c
◦
j · xj = ĉ◦j · x̂j. By optimality of x1j , it follows that
∀xj ∈Pj ĉ◦j · x̂j = c◦j · xj ≤ c◦j · x1j = ĉ◦j · x̂1j .
On the other hand, x̂◦j is the unique minimizer of the objective vector ĉ
◦
j on the
projected polyhedron. Therefore, x̂1j = x̂
◦
j , proving the theorem.
We denote by xIj ∈ Pj the extreme point uniquely exposed by c◦j in the weak





3.5.9 Final power schedules for grid-controlled assets
We solve the master problem again, but assuming that each end-user effectively adopts










subject to Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0
∀j ∈ J, xj = xIj
Let ΦIA be the optimum obtained when solving (MP-f). We know that Φ
I
A can be
induced, and hopefully ΦIA is close to Φ
?
A, the team optimum.
3.6 Post-processing: addressing fairness
In this section, we transform c◦j into c
I
j ∈ C , the “fair” price that uniquely exposes
xIj in the weak sense.
3.6.1 Perceived fairness
In the context of dynamic pricing, fairness is a judgement of whether a price offered
(outcome), and/or the rationale for offering a certain price (process), are reasonable,
acceptable, or justifiable. Price fairness draws on equity theory and distributive
justice, while pricing fairness relates to procedural justice.
Fairness assessments are inherently subjective and usually studied from the buyer’s
perspective: price fairness involves comparing (explicitly or implicitly) one price with
another reference price, or with a range of reference prices; pricing fairness involves
the comparison of a pricing process to social norms [166].
Notions of fairness and unfairness are related, although fairness can be more
difficult to articulate; unfairness is typically clearer and more concrete –people “know”
what is unfair when they see it or experience it. The practice of yield management
in the hospitality and airline industries shows that, although buyers’ perceptions of
price unfairness are based on perceived price differences, a fair pricing scheme does
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not necessarily imply a one-price policy for everyone, nor does it mean that customers
do not accept price changes or price differences.
3.6.2 Axiomatic characterization
We propose that an electricity pricing scheme that verifies the following set of axioms
can be considered as fair, or at least will not be considered as unfair by residential
end-users:
Axiom 1. If users j1 and j2 make the same marginal contributions to minimize the
total generation costs over T , then the payments requested from j1 and j2 over T
should be equal.
Axiom 2. Assume users j1 and j2 are identical in every way, except for their fixed
consumption requirements. If the fixed requirements of j1 are smaller than the fixed
requirement of j2 for every time period t ∈ T , then j1 should not be charged more
than j2 over T .
Axiom 3. Assume users j1 and j2 are identical in every way, except for their flexible
consumption requirements.
(a) If j1 is more flexible than j2 (i.e. if j1 asks for the same amounts over T , but
over wider time intervals), then j1 should not be charged more than j2 over T .
(b) If j1 asks for smaller amounts than jt2 over the same time intervals, then j1
should not be charged more than j2 over T .
Axiom 4. Assume users j1 and j2 are identical in every way, except for their storage
systems. If j1’s storage system is faster and/or has a larger capacity than j2’s storage
system for every time period t ∈ T , then j1 should not be charged more than j2 over
T .
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Axiom 5. Assume users j1 and j2 are identical in every way, except for their dis-
tributed generation capabilities. If j1 produces at least as much as j2 for every time
period t ∈ T , then j1 should not be charged more than j2 over T .
3.6.3 Computing the fair price
The total payments requested from end-users over T should be equal to the total
generation costs incurred to the provider over T (feasibility requirement). Let ΨIj
be the total charge that end-user j ends up paying over T after receiving a pricing





Let Φ?A be the team optimum obtained when solving (MP). For any j0 ∈ J , let
Φ?−j0 be the optimum obtained when solving (MP) for the set of end-users J\{j0}
instead of J . Denote by ∆j0(J) , Φ
?
A − Φ?−j0 the marginal contribution of end-user
j0 in the energy game where all end-users in J work cooperatively with the provider
to minimize the provider’s generation costs. Axiom 1 requires that, for any j1 and j2















(Φ?A − Φ?−j2) (58)







The optima Φ?A and Φ
I
A are known already. However, computing Φ
?
−j centrally for
each j ∈ J requires to solve problem (MP) |J | times, which can be computationally
expensive.
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We propose an alternative approach to compute an approximation of Φ?−j in a
distributed manner, following the multi-level decomposition introduced in Section
3.4. For any level-1 super-prosumer x, let Φ?−x be the optimum obtained when solv-
ing (MP) for the set of level-1 super-prosumers excluding super-prosumer x. Each
level-1 super-prosumer x subsequently determines an approximation of Φ?−j0 for each
of its constituting level-2 (super-)prosumer j0 ∈ Jx by solving the following program:
(PHI-x-j0)










, and Jx is the set of super-prosumers that includes x, and forms
a larger super-prosumer at the immediate upper level (except at level 1, where all
level-1 super-prosumers are in Jx ). This process iterates until Φ̃
?
−j has been com-
puted for each residential prosumer j ∈ J . Substituting Φ?−j for Φ̃?−j in (59), we can
compute ΨIj for all j in J .
Theorem 3. For any end-user j ∈ J , ΨIj as defined in {(56)-(57)} verifies Axioms
1 to 5.
Proof. First, note that ΨIj verifies Axiom 1 by definition. For each of the Axioms 2 to
5 to be verified, we must have ΨIj1 ≤ Ψ
I
j2
, which is equivalent to Φ?A−Φ?−j1 ≤ Φ
?
A−Φ?−j2
according to (57), or Φ?−j2 ≤ Φ
?
−j1 . Let P−j be the polytope for (MP) corresponding
to the case where the set of end-users considered is J\{j} (the sets I and L and
the constraints on the generation and grid storage remain unchanged). Evidently, if
P−j1 ⊆P−j2 , then Φ?−j2 ≤ Φ
?
−j1 .
We show that P−j1 ⊆P−j2 is true for each axiom:
Axiom 2: redefine zj,t as a variable in the end-user optimization problem, with the
additional constraints zj,t ≥ z̄j,t, where z̄j,t is the fixed consumption during t (former
value of zj,t when modeled as a parameter). At optimality zj,t will always be equal to
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z̄j,t since end-user j is minimizing its energy costs. Since z̄j,t1 ≤ z̄j,t2 , P−j1 ⊆ P−j2
is true.
Axiom 3.a: ∀(t1, t2) ∈ T 2 s.t. t1 < t2 and Ej1,t1,t2 > 0, ∃(t3, t4) ∈ T 2 s.t. t1 ≤ t3 <
t4 ≤ t2 and Ej1,t1,t2 = Ej2,t3,t4 . Therefore ∀(t1, t2) ∈ T 2 s.t. t1 < t2,Γj1,t1,t2 ≤ Γj2,t1,t2 ,
and χ′j2 ⊆ χ
′
j1
, which means P−j1 ⊆P−j2 is true.




P−j1 ⊆P−j2 is true.
Axiom 4: ∀t ∈ T , smaxj1,t ≥ s
max
j2,t
, sminj1,t ≥ s
min
j2,t
, smax,+j1,t ≥ s
max,+
j2,t




Therefore P−j1 ⊆P−j2 is true.
Axiom 5: redefine pj,t as a variable and add constraints 0 ≤ pj,t ≤ p̄j,t, where p̄j,t
is the expected local generation during t (former value of pj,t when modeled as a
parameter). At optimality pj,t will always be equal to p̄j,t since j is minimizing costs,
and pj,t is essentially a free energy source. Since p̄j,t1 ≥ p̄j,t2 , P−j1 ⊆P−j2 is true.
In practice, when selecting ĉ◦j as explained in section 3.5.7, we also require that
ĉ◦j · x̂◦j be as close as possible to ΨIj by finding a δ ≥ 0 as small as possible such that
ΨIj (1 − δ) ≤ ĉ◦j · x̂◦j ≤ ΨIj (1 + δ) if δ < 1, and 0 < ĉ◦j · x̂◦j ≤ ΨIj (1 + δ) else. ΨIj is
computed as explained above. When the δ selected is strictly positive, ĉ◦j is rescaled
such that ĉ◦j · x̂◦j be equal to ΨIj . We denote by cIj the final price vector obtained.
3.7 Numerical simulations
In this section, we present simulation results for two real-data test cases that demon-
strate the proposed pricing algorithm.
3.7.1 Building the test cases
To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any standard, publicly-available
case involving a large number of residential prosumers at the time of writing. For






























































































































































































































































































































































































a database of disaggregated customer energy data maintained by Pecan Street Inc.
and available to university researchers.
The time series displayed in Dataport correponds to real-time measurements made
at residential homes, most of them located in Austin, TX. These homes are instru-
mented to record the individual consumption of electric loads and appliances as well
as the solar generation and electric vehicle charging cycle when available.
The first case, which we refer to as the Summer case, consists of |J | = 569
residential homes. The Summer case is based on historical data for the period of
time starting at 6:00 on 6/20/2014 and ending at 6:00 on 6/21/2014. The second
case, which we refer to as the Winter case, consists of |J | = 526 residential homes.
The Winter case is based on historical data for the period of time starting at 6:00 on
12/20/2014 and ending at 6:00 on 12/21/2014. For both cases, we included all the
available observations in Dataport for the period of time considered after removing
the homes with missing or inconsistent measurements.
The generic end-user model previously introduced encompasses several energy
functions: non-controllable generation, fixed and flexible consumption, and storage
(Table 3.2). However, only a subset of these functions may be effectively available
to the end-user. This leads us to define eight different agent types, each type corre-
sponding to a certain combination of energy functions. Types I and II correspond to
agents that are not flexible, while types III to VIII have some degrees of flexibility.
Table 3.3 maps the agent types to the energy functions effectively available. Table
3.3 also presents the distribution of agents per type and per energy function for the
Winter and Summer cases.
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, grid storage is not considered in this
section. Grid generation is also limited to one controllable unit given the relatively
small size of the system.
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3.7.2 Setting realistic values for the model parameters
The Dataport time series define a baseline scenario for each of the two test cases. Each
baseline scenario assumes flat-rate electricity pricing. In addition, we set the model
parameters introduced in section 3.2 to realistic values consistent with the baseline
scenarios. We now explain in detail how these values are set.
3.7.2.1 Flexible consumption
Four types of flexible loads are considered in this simulation section: clothes washer,
dishwasher, dryer, and water heater. For every agent j with flexible consumption ca-
pabilities, we limit the number of flexible time intervals to |τj,2| = 8 to prevent mem-
ory overflow; we further assume consecutive time intervals without loss of generality
(τj,2 = Fj,1). Simulations are run on a 4-core, 6GB machine. Larger computational
capabilities would likely allow for a higher |τj,2|.
We use the following heuristic to allocate the flexible time intervals. The T = 24
time intervals are partitioned into four blocks: 6:00-8:00; 8:00-14:00; 14:00-18:00;
18:00-6:00. Assuming that the provider is looking to smooth the aggregated demand
over T = {1, ..., 24}, we first examine, for each end-user j, if any flexible loads start
after 18:00 under the baseline scenario, which is also the block with the highest
aggregated demand. If no flexible loads are scheduled after 18:00, the 8:00-14:00
block is examined, followed by the 14:00-18:00 block, and finally the 6:00-8:00 block.
Once a block has been selected for each end-user j, we examine the flexible loads
scheduled within that block under the baseline scenario. The beginning of time
interval t1 where the first flexible load a1 starts defines the beginning of the flexible
time period τj,2. This flexible period τj,2 terminates 8 time intervals later, or at
the end of time period 24 (6:00), whichever comes first. We denote by t2 the end
of τj,2. The parameter Ej,t1,t2 is set to the amount of energy used by a1 under the
baseline scenario while Emaxj,t1,t2,t is set to the maximum consumption rate observed in
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the baseline scenario for load a1.
Particular situations are handled as follows. When multiple flexible loads start
at t2, there are all aggregated together into Ej,t1,t2 and E
max
j,t1,t2,t
. For any additional
flexible load starting during interval t′1 with t1 < t
′
1 < t2, the parameters Ej,t′1,t2
and Emaxj,t′1,t2
are set accordingly. For flexible loads starting before t2 but ending after
t2 under the baseline scenario, only the fraction of energy consumed before t2 is
considered flexible. Flexible loads scheduled oustide of τj,2 are treated as fixed loads.
3.7.2.2 Fixed consumption and local generation
For each end-user j, the fixed power requirements zj and the energy produced locally
pj are set according to the baseline scenario since those two quantities are assumed
to be non-controllable.
3.7.2.3 Electric-vehicle storage
The only storage capabilities recorded in Dataport consist of electric-vehicle batteries.
In the following, we assume that any vehicle connected at the beginning of the day
(6:00) under the baseline scenario can be used to smooth the demand until 8:00,
provided that it is left fully charged at 8:00. We also assume that any electric vehicle
arriving sometime during the 18:00-6:00 block can be used to smooth the demand as
long as the batteries are fully charged by 6:00.
The maximum charging rate assigned to each vehicle corresponds to the maxi-
mum charging rate observed in the baseline scenario. We assume that vehicle-to-grid
operations are enabled, and that charging and discharging rates are equal for a given
vehicle. The initial storage levels when the vehicle connects to the home grid are set
according to the initial levels observed in the baseline scenario.
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3.7.3 Simulation results assuming perfect information
Table 3.4 presents a summary of the results obtained for the Winter and Summer
cases. Define Φ0A the cumulative generation cost over T for the baseline scenario.
For both the Winter and Summer cases, we observe that Φ0A ≥ ΦIA ≥ Φ?A. The costs
obtained are naturally dependent on the cost-curve of the generation unit.









Figure 3.6 shows the baseline, desired, and induced schedules aggregated across
the flexible agents only (types III to VIII), as well as the error between the desired and
induced schedules over T . Figure 3.7 shows the same quantities aggregated across
all the agents, flexible and non-flexible. The proposed pricing algorithm allows to
reduce the consumption peak by 13% in the Winter case, and 18% in the Summer
case compared to the baseline (or reference) scenarios.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present the performance of the proposed pricing algorithm per
flexible agent type. For both test cases, the average runtime to compute P̂j remains
below 5 seconds. We first try to solve (Ĥ-j) with ρ = 0, and increase ρ by ε = 1%
every 90 seconds if the attempt is unsuccessful. For the vast majority of agents,
(Ĥ-j) is solved with ρ = 0, the remaining agents solving with ρ = 0.01. The average
combined runtime across all flexible agents is below 17 seconds in both test cases.
Results per agent type show that the average combined runtime increases by a factor
2 to 3 when both flexible consumption and storage are available (agent types VII and
VIII).
Table 3.7 presents the proportion of agents for which the desired schedule x?j (or
its projection x̂?j) is an extreme point of Pj (resp. P̂j). While a majority of desired
schedule x?j are extreme points for Pj, none of the projected schedules are found to be
extreme points for P̂j. Most importantly, none of the desired schedules are uniquely
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12.31 2,870 1,231 1,290 1.76
Summer
case
14.99 16,745 10,414 10,414 0.71
C -exposable for (P-j) in either the strong sense, or even the weak sense. This result
serves as ex-post justification for the algorithmic approach proposed in section 3.5.
3.7.4 Simulation results assuming imperfect information
The simulation results presented above assume an ideal situation where the provider
has full knowledge of the end-users optimization problems. We now study the sensi-
tivity of the results to this assumption.
The information describing the end-users problems can be classified into two types,
structural and usage. The structural information refers to parameters that are typ-
ically fixed (PCC limits, charging/discharging rates, etc.), while the usage informa-
tion refers to parameters characterizing the end-user energy behavior in terms of time
(when?) and magnitude (how much?).
In the following, we focus our sensitivity analysis on the effect of uncertainty over
magnitude. Four types of parameters are of particular interest: the fixed consumption
requirements (zj,t), the flexible consumption requirements (Ej,t1,t2), the solar energy
generated (pj,t), and the initial battery level at the time when the electric car connects
to the home grid (modeled as a one-time energy spike in equation (33)).
We now model these parameters as random variables to account for uncertainty.
For each variable X, the parameter value assumed in the previous simulations is now
treated as the expected value X̄ of X. We further assume that X follows a continuous






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We define four scenario categories: cons-λ, gen-λ, stor-λ and all-λ. In category
cons-λ, only the fixed and flexible consumption requirements are modeled as ran-
dom variables, with λ varying from 5% to 30%. In category gen-λ, only the energy
generated locally is modeled as a random variable, with λ varying from 5% to 30%.
Category stor-λ contains a single scenario where the initial battery levels are mod-
eled as random variables and λ = 5%. Finally, category all-λ also contains a unique
scenario where the fixed and flexible consumption requirements, the energy generated
locally and the initial battery levels are all modeled as random variables, and λ = 5%.
Parameter λ only takes one value when the initial battery levels are involved to avoid
infeasibility (recall that the charging and discharing rates remain unchanged).
In the scenarios defined above, we solve (MP) and select the electricity prices πj,t
assuming that the random variables take their expected values. For each end-user
j, we then examine the end-user response x̃Ij to these prices when the variables take
their actual, random value.
Table 3.8 compares the simulation results obtained when assuming imperfect in-
formation to perfect-info, the scenario assuming perfect information. For both the
Winter and Summer cases, we note an increase in the average individual error. How-
ever, the increase in the aggregated error remains small, with a maximum at 3.64%
for scenario cons-30 in the Winter case.
Table 3.9 and figure 3.8 show the impact of imperfect information on the provider
revenues and individual end-user bills. Imperfect information leads to an average
increase in the end-user bills of up to 86 cents (cons-25, winter), and a maximum
increase observed across the simulation scenarios considered of $27.99 (cons-25, sum-
mer). Imperfect information scenarios always lead to an increase in the provider
revenues.
The results above show that, from the provider standpoint, the proposed pricing
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algorithm is robust with respect to uncertainty as imperfect information has a very
limited impact on the aggregated error across the energy schedules induced, and does
not incur financial losses. However, from the residential end-users standpoint, uncer-
tainty leads to an increase in individual bills that may undermine fairness between
the agents. These results could motivate future work investigating further the impact
of imperfect information on more complex scenarios, including scenarios modeling
uncertainty on magnitude and time.
3.8 Conclusions
This chapter proposes an electricity pricing scheme that induces autonomous resi-
dential prosumers to behave cooperatively and minimize the provider’s generation
costs.
We formulate an economic dispatch model that explicitly accounts for flexible
consumption, storage, and generation capabilities downstream of the meter, as well as
bidirectional power flows. We solve this enhanced economic dispatch in a distributed
way and obtain the team optimum using multi-level primal decomposition to reduce
the size of the problem, and increase end-user privacy protection. Although our focus
in this chapter is on pricing, the enhanced economic dispatch model proposed could
be used extensively in future work to assess the impact on the team optimum of
various technology penetrations downstream of the meter (flexible appliances, solar
generation, electric vehicles, etc.). Additional contraints such as network constraints
could also be added to the model.
We propose a non-iterative pricing algorithm using convex programming and in-
verse linear programming that induces residential prosumers to autonomously achieve
an optimum close to the team optimum. Different from existing non-iterative algo-
rithms, our approach does not use backward induction and does not require closed-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.8: Distribution of the impact of imperfect information on individual bills
across the flexible agents.
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contribution of each residential prosumer in achieving the team optimum.
Simulation results obtained for two test cases based on historical data demonstrate
the proposed approach. In both cases, the proposed pricing scheme allows us to in-
duce an aggregated energy exchange schedule within 2% of the ideal schedule initially
selected at the economic dispatch stage. The impact of imperfect information on the
energy usage magnitude is also assessed. The sensitivity analysis performed shows
that the aggregated error remains below 4% across the various scenarios considered.
However, imperfect information leads to increases in individual bills. Additional inves-
tigations will be required to examine more complex scenarios testing for uncertainty
on magnitude and time.
3.9 Proof I
Proposition 1. Constraints (34) are a necessary and sufficient condition for pro-
sumer j ∈ J to satisfy his energy consumption requirements over T .
It is obvious that constraints (34) are necessary for end-user j to satisfy his energy
requirements over T . To prove that these constraints are also sufficient, think of each
interval t3, t4 for which the corresponding dd variable is nonzero as a job that must
be completed. Each job has a release time (start of period t3) and a due date (end
of period t4). The prosumer has given amounts of energy to expend each time period
t, namely yjt. For each t, the prosumer can choose how to allocate that period’s
energy among the jobs. Energy can only be allocated to a job that has been released
and whose due date has not passed. We want to prove that if constraints (34) are
satisfied, then it is feasible for the prosumer to allocate energy so as to complete each
job by its due date.
Proof. Step 1. The earliest due date rule, EDD, finds a feasible solution for the
prosumer if one exists. (EDD assigns energy to the job with earliest deadline, among
all jobs that have been released but not completed. Ties are broken arbitrarily. If
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that job is completed and more energy remains, the EDD rule is repeated until either
all released jobs are completed or no energy remains.) Proof: Consider any feasible
schedule that is not EDD. At some time t, some released job with due date h gets a
unit of energy that could be given to a different released job with due date h′ < h.
Since the schedule is feasible, both jobs are eventually completed. Trade a unit of
energy from the former job to the latter at time t for a unit of energy that that
latter eventually gets at some time t′ after t. The modified schedule remains feasible
because the former job gets its unit of energy at time t′ ≤ h < h′, i.e. before its due
date, and because the latter job was released by time t. Repeat this modification
until the schedule is EDD.
Step 2. Replace each job that requires g > 1 units of energy with g jobs that
each require one unit. Among all possible cases in which each job requires one unit of
energy, consider a minimal counterexample, a smallest case for which the constraints
(34) are satisfied but no feasible solution for the prosumer exists. If the counterexam-
ple has a one-period job for some period t, remove the job and reduce the available
energy during t by 1. (Notice there must be available energy because the constraint
is satisfied). This is equivalent to forcing the schedule to complete that job. Since
there was no feasible solution at all, there can’t be a feasible solution to this more
restricted case. The constraints (34) are satisfied after the job and unit of energy are
removed, because for every t1, t2 for which the left-hand side is reduced by 1, so is
the right-hand side. But then we would have a smaller counterexample, contradicting
minimality. Therefore the counterexample has no one-period jobs.
Step 3. By step 1, EDD fails to find a feasible solution. Let T be the first time
period at the end of which some job is due, but is not completed by EDD. We claim
that the minimal counterexample has no jobs due later than T . If it did, those jobs
could be removed. Constraints (34) would remain satisfied because the left-hand side
does not change, and the right-had side stays the same or decreases. But that would
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create a smaller counterexample, contradicting minimality.
Step 4. We claim that no energy is available after period T . Since no jobs are due
after T , all constraints with t4 ≤ T are satisfied without using energy after T . If the
counterexample continued beyond period T , it could be truncated. That truncation
would contradict minimality.
Step 5. We claim that no energy is available during period T . If a unit of such
energy exists, remove it and remove a job with start date t and due date T , where
t is the maximum possible value for which such a job exists. (At least one job with
due date T must exist, by step 3.) We will show that these removals produce a
counterexample. That will contradict minimality. The removals could fail to produce
a counterexample in two ways. First, the removals could result in a case for which
the prosumer has a feasible solution. Second, the removals could violate a constraint
(34). The first is impossible for the same reason given in step 2. The removals are
equivalent to assigning a particular unit of energy to a particular job. Since the coun-
terexample has no feasible solution, there can be no feasible solution after restricting
the counterexample to force this particular assignment. Consider the second kind of
possible failure. Removal of the energy unit from period T can only render a con-
straint from (34) with t2 = T infeasible, since by step 4 the counterexample ends at
period T . Suppose constraint t1, T becomes infeasible after the removals. If t1 ≤ t,
the right-hand side of the constraint also decreased by 1 because job t, T was removed.
Hence if t1 ≤ t the constraint does not become infeasible. However, if t1 > t then by
the maximality of t there are no jobs of form t3, T for any t3 ≥ t1. Constraint (34) for
t1, T − 1 is feasible in the counterexample, hence is feasible after the removals (which
don’t change either left or right hand sides). The right-hand side of (34) for t1, T is
the same as for t1, T − 1 because no jobs ≥ t1, T exist. Hence constraint (34) for t1, T
is feasible after the removals. Hence the second kind of failure can not occur, either.
Step 6. By step 5, for all t1 the constraint (34) for t1, T is satisfied using energy
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available from t1 to T − 1. Take all jobs due at T and make them due at T − 1.
The t1, T constraint becomes the new t1, T − 1 constraint, and hence is satisfied. We
have a smaller counterexample, which contradicts minimality. The base case of this
downwards inductive proof has T = 1 and is obvious.
3.10 Proof II
Theorem 4. Given integer matrix A and vector b, rational vector u such that Au ≤ b,
and scalar d, it is strongly NP-complete to determine if the polyhedron {x|Ax ≤ b} has
an extreme point v such that ||v − u|| ≤ d, where “|| ||” denotes either the Euclidean
norm or the L1 norm. Moreover, it is strongly NP-complete to find an approximate
solution to this problem with any constant-factor guarantee.
Proof. The reduction is from 3-partition, which asks, given integer weights wi : i ∈ I,
whether there exists a partition of I into 3-tuples such that sum of weights in each
3-tuple equals w∗ ≡ 3
∑
i∈I wi/|I|.
Let J = {1, 2, . . . , |I|/3}. Define for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J variable xij which represents
whether or not weight i is placed in 3-tuple j. Define additional variables yj : j ∈
J which represent the total weight of 3-tuple j. Define the polyhedron P by the
constraints
0 ≤ xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J (60)∑
i∈I xij = 3 ∀j ∈ J (61)
yj =
∑
i∈I wixij ∀j ∈ J (62)
The polyhedron P ′ defined by constraints (60,61) is a b-matching polytope, which
is well-known to be totally unimodular and such that each b-matching corresponds to
an extreme point. Since constraint (62) imposes no further constraints on the xij and
sets the yj variables to be linear combinations of the xij, there is a 1−1 correspondence
between the extreme points of P and their projections onto the extreme points of P ′.
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By total unimodularity each extreme point of P ′ corresponds to a an integer
solution of constraints (60,61). Therefore each extreme point in P corresponds to a
partition of I into 3-tuples given by the xij variables together with the vector y of
resulting 3-tuple weights. As a consequence, there exists an extreme point in P with
yj = w
∗ ∀j ∈ J iff the answer to the instance of 3-partition is “yes.”







∀i, j; yj = w∗ ∀j ∈ J.
By definition of w∗, u satisfies constraint (62) and hence u ∈ P . The projection of
u onto P ′ is equidistant to all extreme points of P ′ because every extreme point has
|I| components of x equal to 1, and the rest equal to 0. For every extreme point of
P , the value ||u − v|| depends only on how the yj components differ. To be precise,
there exists a valid 3-partition of the weights wi iff P contains an extreme point at
distance from u equal to
|I|(|J | − 1)/|J |+ |I|(|J | − 1|/|J | = 2(|I| − 3)
for the L1 norm, and √
|I|(|J | − 1)
|J |2
+
|I|(|J | − 1)2
|J |2
for the L2 norm. Otherwise, the nearest extreme point of P is farther away from u.
How hard is approximation? Let α > 0 be arbtitrary. Consider the L1 norm.
Scale the wi values by an integer M ≥ α|I|. The closest extreme point of P to u
will have distance ≤ 2|I| (and roughly equal to that) if the 3-partition has a solution,
and will have distance > M (roughly M + 2|I|) if not. Therefore, if we could find an
extreme point within a factor α of the closest one, we could solve 3-partition. This




Theorem 5. Let P ⊂ <n be a polyhedron defined by inequalities Ax + By ≤ b. Let
P̂ denote the projection of P onto the y variables. It is strongly NP-complete, given
y∗ ∈ P̂ , to determine whether or not there exists an extreme point (x, y) of P such that
y = y∗. Hence it is strongly NP-complete to determine whether a point is uniquely
exposable in the weak sense.
Proof. The reduction is from X3C, Exact 3-Cover. An instance of X3C comprises
a collection S of 3-tuples of a ground set G. An exact 3-cover is a subset S ′ ⊂ S
that partitions G, that is, such that |S ′| = |G|/3 and ∪s∈S′s = G. X3C remains
NP-complete when restricted to instances such that every element of G appears in
the same number of elements of S. Let xs : s ∈ S equal 1 if s is chosen to be in S ′ and
0 if not. The corresponding LP constraints are 0 ≤ xs ≤ 1. All other constraints will
be equality constraints that define additional variables in terms of the xs variables,
so the set of extreme points of P will correspond to the extreme points of the |S|-
dimensional hypercube. Let Bsg = 1 if s contains g ∈ G and 0 otherwise. To check
for an exact 3-Cover, define additional variables yg : g ∈ G by yg =
∑
s∈S = Bsgxs.
Then yg = 1∀g iff the xs variables define an exact cover. It remains to verify that
y∗ = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ P̂ . Let x∗ = |G|
3|S|(1, 1, . . . , 1). Then (x
∗, y∗) ∈ P so y∗ ∈ P̂ . Since
X3C is strongly NP-complete, the proof is complete.
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CHAPTER IV
A CROSS-BOUNDARY APPROACH FOR THE
CO-PRODUCTION OF GRID ARCHITECTURE MODELS
4.1 Introduction
Over the past decade, in the U.S., the modernization of the national electricity
grid has taken the form of a technology-led transformation. As early as 2004, the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) released a National Electric Delivery Technolo-
gies Roadmap to guide technology development [31]. This strategic planning effort
was rapidly articulated around desired grid characteristics [111, 152, 153]. Finally,
Congress directed the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to de-
velop technology standards that facilitate interoperability between the various grid
components [115].
Along with these efforts towards technology planning and coordination, the Amer-
ican Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided $4.5 billion in appropriations
for programs stimulating the research, development, demonstration and deployment
of smart grid technologies. At the same time, new energy innovation institutions
focused on particular technology states were established including the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency-Energy division (ARPA-E), the Energy Frontier Research
Centers (EFRCs), and the Energy Innovation Hubs [108, 109].
A decade after the launch of the “Grid 2030” initiative [30], significant progress
has been made towards the deployment of key enabling technologies including grid-
connected distribution generation and storage, transmission and distribution automa-
tion, advanced meters and advanced measurement technology [152, 153].
However, a comprehensive vision for the future electricity grid as a whole is yet to
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be developed. The initial intent to co-develop the future architecture of the grid along
with new technologies [30, p. 14] remains largely unrealized; instead, the development
of multiple technology-oriented programs has been prevailing. Desired properties for
the future grid have been identified [111, 152], but there is no literature proposing
an architecture that demonstrates these characteristics. The need for developing a
common information model to represent the future grid has been identified [35], but
this need is still largely unmet and is not prioritized as such (e.g.: [11, 101]).
In the context of this chapter, an ‘architecture’ –or ‘system architecture’—for the
future grid consists of a set of specific architecture models. Such models, as defined
in systems engineering, can be used to operationalize the concept of ‘vision’ for the
future grid. They include objective models (reflecting the grid objectives), models of
form (the elements and interfaces constituting the grid), functional models (how the
grid behaves), performance models (how effectively are the objectives satisfied), and
managerial models (process describing the transition to the future grid, and the way
it will be managed) [93].
This chapter attempts to answer the following questions: (1) Why is a new archi-
tecture for the future U.S. electricity grid needed? (2) Why has such an architecture
not emerged over the past decade? and (3) Should policy makers try to facilitate this
development process, and if so, how?
First, we document the need for new grid architecture models (section 4.2). We
identify three factors that make the development of such models a necessary require-
ment towards grid modernization: (1) the increasing collaborative nature of the grid,
(2) the blurring of boundaries between the various disciplines concerned with the grid,
and (3) the blurring of functions performed by some of the grid components. We ar-
gue that the lack of a comprehensive and shared vision for the future electricity grid
is a significant barrier to the effective modernization of the U.S. electricity system.
Second, we frame the grid architecture problem –namely the absence of grid
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architecture—as both a market failure legitimizing government intervention, and a
problem-of-problems –or meta-problem—requiring the development of non-conventional
methods of solution (section 4.3). We conceptualize the substantive problem as dis-
tances –spatial, temporal, conceptual and cultural– that prevent the various communities-
of-practice involved to effectively cooperate.
Third, we propose a policy approach to address the grid architecture problem.
We introduce the notions of broker and boundary object that serve as a theoretical
framework for the proposed approach (section 4.4). We illustrate how this framework
can foster cross-disciplinary research work on the future electricity grid based on an
experiment conducted at the research group level (section 4.5). We propose to scale
up this experiment using the concept of boundary organization (section 4.6).
Our work, focused on the U.S. case, is primarily directed to national and interna-
tional policymakers involved in either assessing existing programs or designing new
policy initiatives that support the modernization of electricity grids from a system-
level perspective. It also provides insights relevant to any stakeholder concerned with
the development of new architecture models for future electricity grid.
4.2 The need for architecture models
In this section, we first identify and discuss three factors motivating the development
of new architecture models for the future electricity grid. We then review the recent
efforts to develop such models and analyze their limitations.
4.2.1 The electricity grid: an evolving system-of-systems
Since the early days of electricity, the U.S. national grid has mostly evolved incre-
mentally through variations and extensions of original architectures that had proved
by use to be sound, such as the Westinghouse concept of universal supply system
[71]. At the same time, the U.S. grid has never been a monolithic system: many of its
components –in particular the local distribution systems—can be seen as systems in
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their own right. They are acquired, integrated, and managed separately; they interact
to provide functions not provided by any of the components alone; and in some cases,
they continue to operate and fulfill their own valid purposes if disassembled from the
overall system.
Over the past decade, new types of grid components enjoying relative operational
and managerial independence have emerged. Most of these components have finer
granularity than distribution systems, the traditional finest level of managerial au-
thority. This change suggests that the “system-of-systems” [94] nature of the U.S.
national grid, which is not new, will increase in complexity due to an increasing
number of system components.
Electric vehicles are among those new components. Their primary purpose is to
transport individuals and goods, but they may also provide support services to the
grid [148, 58]. Home energy management systems (HEMS) are yet another example.
HEMS follow their own, local objectives, but may also contribute to the objectives
assigned to the whole system [70].
Therefore, the normal operational mode of many of the future grid components
will not be subordinated to any central authority, contrary to “directed” systems-of-
systems [94] (Fig. 4.1). However, will these system components collaborate to fulfill
some agreed-upon central purposes (“collaborative” system-of-systems)? Or will the
future electricity grid lack both a central management authority and centrally agreed-
upon purposes (“virtual” system-of-systems)?
Virtual systems-of-systems fulfill purposes that are dynamic and change at the
whim of the users. New purposes and corresponding behavior may arise at any time,
including unexpected or undesired ones. The long-term nature of such systems is
determined by highly distributed and partially invisible mechanisms [94]. A trans-
formation of the U.S. national grid into a virtual system-of-systems could undermine
the stability of grid operations, and eventually threaten national security, a centrally
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Figure 4.1: Three different forms of managerial control for the national electricity
grid modeled as a system-of-systems.
agreed-upon purpose par excellence.
Thus, the future electricity grid must be architected to ensure a safe evolution
towards a collaborative system-of-systems that continues to perform at least some
centrally agreed-upon purposes (Fig. 4.1). This architecture must ensure that grid
participants have the right incentives to collaborate. It may also specify some prede-
termined rules-of-engagement to keep the system operations stable over time. In this
context, architecture models for the future electricity grid appear both as a neces-
sary set of tools to guide the evolutions of the grid through technically, economically
and politically stable intermediate forms, and as a structure around which future
collaboration will take place.
Furthermore, to ensure effective collaboration among the future grid participants,
we claim that such architecture must result from a cooperative decision-making pro-
cess involving the various stakeholders concerned with the grid. This chapter attempts
to characterize the complexity of this cooperation process and analyzes how it could
possibly be expedited.
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4.2.2 Blurring of knowledge boundaries
The notion of cooperation implicitly implies both the existence of boundaries that
mark the limits of a subject or a sphere of activity, and the intention to work across
these boundaries to produce or create something. The grid was initially designed as a
combination of electric components that distributed electric light to the public using
a central-station supply approach (e.g.: [71]). Since then, it has gradually evolved
into a system that overcomes the boundaries of traditional engineering disciplines
(Table 4.1).
This evolution towards cross-disciplinary involvement relates, first, to the goals
assigned to the electricity grid. In the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis, these goals
started to become multidimensional, with new goals including energy security, eco-
nomic growth and environmental protection (see for instance the Declaration of Find-
ings and Purposes in the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977). These
goals were reaffirmed in the Energy Policy Act (EPA) of 2005, the Energy Indepen-
dence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, and the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act (ARRA) of 2009. Addressing these multiple goals required knowledge in
multiple disciplines including electrical engineering, but also mechanical engineering,
material science, communications, controls, optimization, computing, environmental
science, public policy, law, and finance. Second, this increasing involvement of mul-
tiple disciplines also resulted from the “highly arbitrary” organization of knowledge
into disciplines [15] that often reflects social conventions (e.g.: [53]), leading systems
such as the electricity grid to develop in interdisciplinary gaps. Consequently, the
U.S. grid progressively became a multidisciplinary system with multiple disciplines
working on some of its aspects in parallel or sequentially, but rarely challenging their
boundaries.
In 2003, the “Smart Grid 2030” initiative aimed to go one step further by bringing
together members from different disciplines to develop shared goals for the modern
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grid and generate new common methodologies, perspectives, and knowledge [30].
This resulted in the identification of desired properties of the modern grid, and the
development of metrics for measuring progress towards implementation of smart grid
technologies, practices, and services [111, 152, 153].
The next logical step consists of moving from interdisciplinarity to transdisci-
plinarity –the most advanced degree of involvement of multiple disciplines [27]–and
encourage scientists from relevant disciplines, non-scientists and other stakeholders
to develop a shared conceptual framework for the grid –a vision, an architecture–
that transcends the disciplinary boundaries and looks at the dynamics of the whole
electricity grid in a holistic way.
This move towards transdisciplinarity has emerged organically; it is not a goal in
itself but a consequence [86] of the more complex set of objectives pursued at the
system level since the 1970s, and of the arbitrariness of disciplinary boundaries. Yet,
the lack of architecture models for the future grid is evidence that this move towards
transdisciplinarity is incomplete, resulting in a form of inefficiency. Architecture mod-
els are the missing link between the various disciplines involved in the modernization
of the U.S. grid. They are required, not only as a set of tools guiding the electric-
ity system evolutions or as a structure ensuring future collaboration among actors,
but also as a new ontology that transcends the existing knowledge boundaries and
creates a common universe of discourse between the various actors involved in the
modernization of the grid.
4.2.3 Blurring of functional boundaries
Architecture models for the future grid can be seen as a shared conceptual framework
that transcends the disciplinary boundaries. They also constitute simplified repre-
sentations of the grid as a cyber-physical system that matter when it comes to decide







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In decision-making, the concept of bounded rationality is the idea that rationality
of individuals is limited by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of their
minds, and the finite amount of time they have to make a decision [134]. Because
decision-makers lack the ability and resources to arrive at the optimal solution, they
instead apply their rationality only after having constructed simplified models of real-
life situations [136].
In the electricity industry, the simplified model that has traditionally been in use
to describe the grid divides the electricity system into four main categories: genera-
tion, transmission, distribution, and energy utilization. This classification dates back
from the Westinghouse concept of universal supply system displayed at the Chicago
exposition of 1893 and first implemented at the Niagara Falls [71]. The use of the four-
category model has extended well beyond the boundaries of engineering disciplines.
For instance, the electricity value chain in power systems economics is traditionally
characterized using the four-category representation. Specific policies and policy in-
stitutions have also been developed over time for each of the four segments.
It is notable that in all the major planning reports or roadmaps released over the
past ten years in the U.S., including [30, 31, 111, 152, 153, 101, 11], new objectives,
new properties, new functionalities for the electricity grid are discussed, but the
underlying model on which the stakeholders project their goals, problem formulations
and solutions is always –implicitly or explicitly– the four-category model.
Consistent with Henderson and Clark’s work on architectural innovation, we argue
that the “architectural knowledge” relative to that dominant design has become so
deeply embedded in the structure and information-processing procedures of the vari-
ous organizations concerned with the electricity grid that they have progressively lost
their ability to learn new “architectural knowledge”, or even recognize the emergence
of new designs in their environment. Instead, these organizations have mostly been fo-
cused on learning new “component knowledge” to improve the particular components
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of the dominant design [63].
Yet, the dominant, four-category representation is becoming less and less accurate
to serve as a simplified model for the grid because the realities it represents have been
changing.
First, a new function, energy storage, is emerging [33]. This new function, central
in the future grid, does not fit into the traditional representation.
Second, there has been an emerging trend over the past decade to move from
four differentiated categories of entities, each limited to perform one function, to
undifferentiated entities performing multiple functions. This blurring of functional
boundaries is particularly noticeable at the end-user level: while end-users were in
the past limited to consume electricity, they can now produce (e.g., solar panels),
store (e.g., stand-alone storage system, EV battery), and even inject electricity back
into the grid [70]. The traditional classification model does not accommodate for
these developments.
Third, the electrical grid has evolved from a vertically-integrated physical system
–limited to carrying electrons from generation units to end-users– to a complex set of
distributed cyber-physical systems equipped with new communication [59] and com-
putational capabilities [163]. This move towards increased operational and managerial
independence (Fig. 4.1) comes with a significant fragmentation of the decision-making
entities concerned with the operation and planning of the grid. The traditional rep-
resentation of the grid, describing a purely electric and vertically integrated system,
does not reflect all these recent developments, making it necessary to develop new
simplified models for the future electricity grid.
We now discuss several limitations of the recent efforts to address the need for
new grid architecture models.
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Table 4.2: Factors motivating the development of architecture models for the future
electricity grid
Key factor Role of architecture models
Increasing
collaborative
nature of the grid
Guide the future evolutions of the grid through stable intermediate forms,




Provide a new ontology that transcends the existing knowledge boundaries
and creates a common universe of discourse between the discussants involved




Offer a simplified but accurate representation of the grid that accommodates
for the new storage function and the emerging decision-making entities
performing multiple functions.
4.2.4 Developing architecture models: limitations of recent efforts
Over the past decade, the need to facilitate communication and cooperation between
the various stakeholders through the development of common models has been recog-
nized. For example, a “common representation of information models for the smart
grid” has been identified as an important pre-requirement to any attempt to develop
a comprehensive vision for the future electricity grid [35]. But a number of limiting
factors have undermined the recent efforts.
4.2.4.1 Definition vs. characterization
The action of defining what the future grid architecture should look like and the action
of describing its desired properties have frequently been confused. All the major
planning –or so called ‘vision’– documents that we reviewed, including [30, 31, 111,
152, 153, 101, 11], are limited to a description of some of the desired characteristics
of the future grid in lieu of a comprehensive definition of its future architecture. The
future grid was sometimes even presented as “defined by its characteristics” [112].
This first confusion did not facilitate the emergence of architecture models; we show
in section 4.4 that it can be further explained by the ill-defined nature of the grid
architecture problem.
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4.2.4.2 Architecture, interoperability and standards
The loose use of the term architecture generated additional difficulties. In particular,
the term architecture has often been confused with the related –but distinct– concepts
of interoperability and standards. For instance, the terms architecture, standards and
interoperability are grouped under the same metric in the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) smart grid reports [152, 153].
Interoperability is the ability of two or more systems or components to exchange
information and to use the information that has been exchanged [72]. Interoperability
is therefore a property of a system and often results from the implementation of
standards [73]. Open standards in particular can facilitate interoperability [42]. A
system architecture may also support the interoperability of the system’s components,
such as service-oriented architectures [7]. However, strictly speaking, the notion of
interoperability does not apply to system architectures, but only to the systems or
components they represent.
4.2.4.3 Legacy representations
Over the past decade, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has
been one of the very few organizations in the U.S. to make tangible, publicly-available
contributions towards the development of a system architecture for the future elec-
tricity grid. In particular, the NIST conceptual model developed and maintained by
the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) –a public-private partnership estab-
lished by NIST—constitutes the one notable attempt to mitigate the rigidity of the
traditional, four-category representation of the grid [115]. The NIST model was sub-
sequently extended by the Smart Grid Coordination Group (SGCG), the European
counterpart of the SGIP [22].
Although this model constitutes a valuable first step, it is important to recognize
that the NIST model is essentially limited to extend the traditional representation
105
by building additional categories on top of the four traditional categories (Fig. 4.2).
The NIST model also fails to address the blurring of functions discussed above. In
the longer term, relying on such legacy representation to characterize the future grid
may prevent effective collaboration among the future grid participants in that it does
not fully reflect the functional changes that are currently taking place. It may also
re-enforce “path dependency” by limiting the rate of integration of radically new ideas
–in particular new architectural knowledge—possibly leading to technological lock-in.
Figure 4.2: The NIST/SGIP conceptual model decomposed into traditional and new
categories.
4.2.4.4 Predominance of interoperability considerations
Since its inception by NIST, the SGIP has approached the development of new archi-
tecture models primarily as a means to enable interoperability. This is consistent with
section 1305 of the EISA of 2007 which mandates NIST to coordinate the develop-
ment of a smart grid interoperability framework. However, from a policy standpoint,
interoperability is not in itself a primary goal of the future electricity grid. Enabling
interoperability is important only in that it contributes to the broader economic,
environmental and social goals that motivate the modernization of the U.S. grid.
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This confusion in the hierarchy of objectives can be further observed in the for-
mulation of the EISA. Section 1305 motivates the development of an interoperability
framework only by the need to “enable all electric resources, including demand-side
resources, to contribute to an efficient, reliable electricity network” (emphasis added).
Increased efficiency and reliability are indeed desired properties that can be improved
through interoperability. But the future grid also has broader objectives –including
energy security, economic growth and environmental protection—that could greatly
benefit from the development of new architecture models, making the focus on inter-
operability too narrow and limiting.
The subordination of architecture development to smart grid interoperability re-
flects more generally the fact that none of the three energy-related bills passed over
the past decade in the U.S. –the EPA of 2005, the EISA of 2007, and the ARRA of
2009– formally recognized that the development of architecture models is a necessary
condition to achieve the goals assigned to the future electricity grid.
4.3 Framing the grid architecture problem
4.3.1 The absence of architecture: a market failure
4.3.1.1 Characterization
From a public policy perspective, the difficulty to converge to a shared vision for
the future electricity grid can be framed as a market failure by either focusing on
externalities, or by examining the public good nature of the grid architecture.
The development of a shared vision for the future grid can be seen as a ‘chicken-
and-egg’ problem. Any architecture development requires some sense of the technol-
ogy available to ensure effective implementation. Developing that technology requires
in turn that the desired functionalities of the future architecture have been identified.
As soon as the architecture is defined, the technology enabling the corresponding
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functions can be developed and implemented. In that sense, the development of ar-
chitecture models for the future grid generates positive externalities that affect all the
stakeholders involved.
Another approach to characterize the absence of grid architecture as a market fail-
ure consists of considering the architecture itself as a good and examining its nature.
An architecture model is a piece of information, and consumption of information is
non-rivalrous –one person’s consumption does not interfere with another’s. In addi-
tion, the architecture of the future grid is not excludable in use since it must result
from a cooperative design process and remain ‘open source’ to achieve its purpose
of developing a shared vision that provides to the future grid participants the right
incentives to collaborate. Thus, architecture models for the future grid have pure
public good attributes [13]. Pure public goods are generally not supplied by markets
because of the inability of private providers to exclude those who do not pay for
them [157, 160]. In the literature, other aspects of electricity grids have also been
characterized as public goods such as network reliability [121] or more generally the
security of electricity supply [1].
4.3.1.2 Consequences
Valuation and free-riding problems arise from the public good nature of the archi-
tecture of the future grid. The various stakeholders receiving some level of positive
benefits from the development of architecture models do not have any incentive to
reveal honestly the magnitude of these benefits (valuation problem). If contributions
for developing architecture models are to be based on benefit levels, stakeholders have
an incentive to understate their benefit levels; if contributions are not tied to benefit
levels, they may overstate their benefit levels.
The possibility of free-riding also discourages honest participation. If a given
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stakeholder does not contribute and everyone else does, the architecture models pro-
vided, from which he cannot effectively be excluded, will be essentially the same as
if he did contribute (free-riding problem). On the other hand, if he contributes and
others do not, architecture models will not be provided anyway. Either way our stake-
holder is better off not contributing. Both valuation and free-riding problems tend
to be worse in larger groups of stakeholders [160] as it is the case with the electricity
grid (cf. Appendix 4.8).
The inability of private markets to develop and provide architecture models for the
future electricity grid is a market failure that legitimates government intervention and
requires the use of nonmarket mechanisms. Generic policy alternatives include direct
supply by government bureaus or independent agencies, or indirect supply through
contracting. But beyond the form of government intervention –direct or indirect– is
the question of the actual solution method to develop such architecture models. Non-
market outputs –such as architecture models for the future grid– are often hard to
define [165]. There is no standard production technology to develop such non-market
outputs, no evaluation mechanism equivalent to profit or loss for appraising success,
no specified procedure for terminating unsuccessful production. This calls for a more
in-depth examination of the nature of the architecture problem.
4.3.2 Developing a grid architecture: a meta-problem
Defining what the future grid should look like is a planning task that presents char-
acteristics typical of a particular class of policy problems referred to as “complex”,
“messy”, “ill-defined”, “squishy”, or “wicked” in the literature [95, 141, 124, 138].
The foremost characteristic of the grid architecture problem is that it has no defini-
tive formulation. Each of the various interest groups defines the problem differently
according to their own objectives and values. Because there is no definitive problem
statement, the various discussants often jump directly from their understanding of
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the energy challenges to a range of solutions addressing their objectives, and their
problem formulation. For some, environmental concerns –such as climate change or
negative impacts on ecosystems– are the problem. Smart grid technologies with posi-
tive environmental impacts should therefore be an important point of focus [113, 65].
For others, reliability [106], efficiency and affordability are the key metrics; for them,
the future grid should be an ‘optimized’ grid. For some others, economic benefits
[97], security and privacy issues [96, 83], or job creations [159] are critical indicators
to monitor as the grid is being modernized. The grid architecture problem therefore
appears to be a meta-problem –a problem-of-problems– that is ill-structured because
both the problem boundaries and the problem representations held by the diverse
stakeholders seem to be “unmanageably huge” [34, p. 83].
Other characteristics of “wicked” problems as defined by Rittel and Webber [124]
are present. The definition of what the future grid should look like has no stopping
rules since it is hardly possible to design and implement a grid that is at the same
time fully reliable, secure, and highly efficient while providing electricity at afford-
able costs, preserving the environment, and supporting energy independence. The
goals pursued are multidimensional: they inevitably conflict with each other and re-
quire trade-offs. Additionally, there are no ‘right’ solutions since each technology
has advantages and disadvantages. In the case of electricity generation for instance,
fossil-fueled technologies are comparatively cheap [155] but pollute more; nuclear en-
ergy is emissions-free but presents risks; solar or wind technologies are renewable but
intermittent. Finally, every solution component is a ‘one-shot operation’ that leaves
traces that can hardly be undone: the construction of a power plant takes several
months or years and has important upfront costs [154]; the adoption of new market
and policy regulations leads entire sectors to change their strategies; enabling com-
munication with electricity customers requires the large-scale deployment of smart
meters.
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Thus, we argue that the grid architecture problem is both a market failure and a
meta-problem. We now propose a formulation for the substantive problem.
4.3.3 Formulating the substantive problem
4.3.3.1 From disciplines to communities-of-practice
The move towards transdisciplinarity in the context of the electricity grid suggests
that traditional disciplines –with somewhat artificial boundaries—are in fact not the
right level of analysis to understand how cooperation could be fostered to facilitate
the emergence of a shared and comprehensive vision for the future grid. Instead,
the recent literature suggests considering communities-of-practice as the fundamental
unit of analysis (e.g.: [135]).
Communities-of-practice are formal or informal groups of actors. Within each
group, members share a common domain of interest, engage in joint activities, and
develop a shared repertoire of resources [162]. The concept of community-of-practice
allows for describing the social complexity inherent to the electricity grid at multiple
levels of scale. At the local level, each of the organizations concerned with the electric-
ity grid contains multiple communities-of-practice. At the system level, communities
of practice may also cross formal organizational or institutional boundaries. This
community-based decomposition is therefore scale-invariant and can be proposed to
map the complexity of the various stakeholders involved (Fig. 4.3).
4.3.3.2 Barriers to cooperation between and within communities
The increasing involvement of multiple organizations, disciplines, and communities-
of-practice presents both opportunities and challenges for the future electricity grid.
Among the opportunities is the fact that innovation is fostered by cooperation and
knowledge sharing across disciplinary, professional or organizational boundaries [38,
17, 18, 77, 87]. The large and diverse set of stakeholders involved in the modernization








































































































































On the other hand, the fact that most innovation happens at the boundaries be-
tween disciplines or specializations [87] also explains why innovation proves so difficult
to create and maintain. Conceptual gaps exist between stakeholders from different
practices. These gaps lead to multiple and often differing viewpoints that can be
hard to incorporate in a fair and flexible manner. In addition, and contrary to the
“myth of unidisciplinary competence” [15], conceptual gaps also exist within a partic-
ular practice. These are gaps between members focusing on specialties that are only
very remotely related, or gaps between members with different levels of competence
–experts and novices.
Other barriers to cooperation include spatial and temporal distances that limit
cooperative efforts between different communities [43]. The various stakeholders con-
cerned with the future of the U.S. electricity grid are spatially distributed across the
country with limited opportunities to meet face-to-face. Even though communication
technology enables new forms of collaborative work, critical stages of collaborative
work –such as dealing with “ill-defined” problems– appear to require some level of
face-to-face interaction [117].
Temporal distances relate to the fact that complex systems such as the electricity
grid are not designed once and for all. Instead, their initial design is followed by
extended periods of evolution and redesign involving people who were not members
of the original design team [43]. This is particularly relevant to the electricity indus-
try, with the first electric networks being built a century ago: the majority of the
current transmission and distribution lines are 25 years or older; many of the energy
management systems currently in use were installed in the 1970s and coded in FOR-
TRAN –a programming language originally developed in the 1950s; and the original
specifications of existing hardware and software are often missing. In addition, the
workforce is aging: 25 to 35% of the utility technical workforce as of 2010 is likely to
retire by 2015 [97], which will create additional temporal gaps between and within
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organizations and communities concerned with the electricity grid.
Finally, cultural differences between groups may also constitute a barrier to co-
operation. In particular, climate change and energy security –two issues that the
emerging electricity grid aims to tackle– are inherently international issues to which
national solutions can at best offer partial answers [161]. These issues require some
form of international cooperation between national organizations, or within interna-
tional teams. Differences in process or values increase the likelihood of misunder-
standings [66, 67].
Thus, we argue that the spatial, temporal, conceptual and cultural distances be-
tween the various communities-of-practice involved in the modernization of the elec-
tricity grid constitute obstacles preventing effective cooperation. We claim that a
reduction of these distances constitutes an instrumental goal that would tremen-
dously increase the prospects for convergence towards a shared vision for the future
electricity grid.
Market forces alone cannot tackle this goal due to valuation and free-riding prob-
lems arising from the public good nature of any shared architecture. Traditional
planning methods focused on computing optimal solutions are equally ineffective at
addressing this goal due to the ill-defined nature of the grid architecture problem.
There is no optimal solution to the architecture problem that would be substantively
rational. Instead, the rationality of good solutions to the architecture problem (i.e.
good architecture models) will be predominately a procedural rationality. In the rest
of this chapter, we therefore attempt to develop an “effective procedural technique”
[137] to address the grid architecture problem, drawing on the concepts of broker,
boundary object, and boundary organization. Secondly, we examine what role poli-
cymakers could play to facilitate this process.
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4.4 Theoretical framework
In this section, we introduce the notions of brokers [162] and boundary objects [140]
that have been proposed as possible channels through which distinct communities
can communicate and cooperate (Fig. 4.3). The rest of this chapter will draw on this
theoretical framework.
4.4.1 Brokers
Brokering consists of connections provided by people who can introduce elements of
one community into another [162]. Brokering often arises from multi-membership:
a member of several communities can potentially help translate, coordinate, and
align their various perspectives. A broker is not a manager who simply coordinates
multiple specialists; he is an individual who has knowledge in multiple specialties. In
the literature, the terms boundary analyst [46], organizational translator [12], and
boundary spanner [85, 105] are also used to refer to those individuals who can frame
the interests of one community in terms of other communities’ perspectives.
In the energy sector, the emerging need for brokers results mechanically from the
inevitable transition towards an energy system transcending traditional disciplines.
This transition requires the electricity industry to move beyond the standard approach
where engineers solve technical problems, policymakers craft legislation, economists
analyze what motivates personal energy choices, political scientists focus on the gov-
ernance of the grid, biologists discuss environmental impacts, communication majors
translate complex language, and sociologists develop tools to influence behavior [84].
The electricity industry has recognized the need for “super-engineers” able to
work simultaneously in multiple domains such as power systems, information science
and digital technology [122]. Fisher and Schoenberger argue that engineers can bring
a technological awareness to the policy debate and, reciprocally, they should also
be able to identify and re-think their own technical assumptions, particularly during
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times of economic and regulatory change [44]. Kirshenbaum and Webber advocate for
experts equipped to navigate through all of the technical, political and social issues
related to energy [84].
The rise of this nascent labor force with new competencies in the area of energy and
sustainability requires planning educational programs, developing cross-disciplinary
curricula, and assessing existing programs accordingly [6]. Current students must
typically choose to enroll in a single department where they are exposed to narrow
perspectives of the energy sector and do not obtain comprehensive understanding of
what lies ahead [84]. Barriers to these developments include the lack of recognition
for cross-disciplinary education and experience, and more generally the difficulty to
evaluate cross-disciplinary research going beyond a specific field of study [110].
It is notable that none of the planning reports or roadmaps that we reviewed
identified the necessity of major, cross-disciplinary evolutions in academic curricula.
The need to rejuvenate the U.S. power and energy workforce is often recognized, but
the need to facilitate the rise of brokers to establish new connections between the
growing number of communities-of-practice involved is never mentioned, nor is the
transdisciplinary nature of the grid ever considered as a barrier to the modernization
of the electricity grid.
4.4.2 Boundary objects
Boundary objects constitute a second option to build bridges across communities and
a method of addressing ill-defined problems such as the grid architecture problem.
Star and Griesemer [140] introduced the term boundary object to describe objects
that are “both plastic enough to be adaptable across multiple viewpoints, yet robust
enough to maintain a common identity” across more than one social world. Bound-
ary objects have different meanings in different communities, but their structure is
common enough to coordinate these different perspectives towards a shared purpose.
116
In practice, boundary objects consist of “artifacts, documents, terms, concepts,
and other forms of reification around which communities of practice can organize
their interconnections” [162]. Examples of boundary objects include maps [140],
engineering design drawings [62], and timelines [167]. The concept of boundary object
has been utilized across a range of fields including new product development [17],
project management [132], biomedical innovation [142] and educational policy [36].
In this chapter, we propose to consider architecture models for the future electricity
grid as boundary objects.
The initial framing of the concept of boundary object was motivated by the desire
to analyze the nature of cooperative work in the absence of consensus [140]. In this
context, boundary objects are essentially working arrangements addressing informa-
tion and work requirements as perceived by various groups who wish to cooperate.
They are organic structures that arise over time from durable cooperation among
communities-of-practice and help develop and maintain coherence between them [10].
“Interpretive flexibility” is at the core of boundary objects and consists of the
possibility for different people to interpret and use differently the same object ac-
cording to their local needs. Another salient characteristic is the dynamic between
the high-level –and sometimes fairly vague– description of an object serving all the
perspectives at once, and the more specific features tailored locally to the needs of
each community [139].
The notions of brokers and boundary objects serve as theoretical framework for
the approach that we propose to address the grid architecture problem. Brokers
experience the gaps between the communities of which they are members as cog-
nitive dissonances; they develop strategies to reduce them ‘internally’. Boundary
objects –and more specifically, the back-and-forth motions between their high-level
and tailored descriptions—allow each community to (1) contrast the facts and norms
that constitute their “boundary judgments” [150] with those of other communities
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(i.e.‘externally’), (2) explore their implications, and eventually (3) revise them when
necessary.
4.5 Small-scale experiment and discussion
In this section, we take an ethnographic approach and describe how boundary objects
emerged within a cross-disciplinary team conducting research on electricity systems.
We report on both the process that led to the production of boundary objects, and
the boundary objects produced per se. This small-scale example illustrates how
the theoretical framework introduced above can foster durable cooperation among
communities-of-practice concerned with the future electricity grid, and develop and
maintain coherence between them.
4.5.1 Anomalies and negotiation process
The Advanced Computational Electricity Systems (ACES) Laboratory at Georgia
Tech is a cross-disciplinary research group of twenty members created in 2009. The
group focuses on electricity systems for both small- and large-scale grids. A distinc-
tive feature is that every group member has background in at least two disciplines,
including power systems engineering, computer science, controls, communications, op-
timization, economics, finance, business administration, and public policy. Another
feature is the cultural diversity within the group, with eight nationalities represented.
As they were starting to get involved into research projects related to the future
electricity grid, ACES members rapidly faced barriers similar to some of the “anoma-
lies” that Star identified as a basis for the emergence of boundary objects [139]. A
number of elements or desired properties of the future electricity grid –such as the
energy storage function—did not fit into the four-category representation of the grid,
making it increasingly difficult to accurately describe the future state of the system
using traditional representation models. Since some of the research that was being
performed addressed realities that were not depicted in the traditional representation,
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reporting externally about this “backstage” work and putting it in perspective with
the rest of the electricity system was problematic. Internally, these gaps also uncov-
ered the difficulty to collect, organize, and coordinate distributed knowledge related
to the ongoing projects among the researchers involved using traditional representa-
tions.
The need for new arrangements that would support the new information require-
ments of the future grid was addressed through a series of informal meetings that took
place biweekly for about a year. These meetings provided opportunities for the group
members to enter an informal process of negotiation to find new ways to describe
the electricity grid. This negotiation involved the interaction of two constituent –and
concurrent– processes, participation and reification ([162], Fig. 4.3). Group mem-
bers participated in the process by bringing their vision of what the future grid was
to look like in terms of objectives, properties, and requirements based on their own
understanding of the desired grid properties. At the same time, symbols, concepts,
diagrams and use cases that congealed some aspects of the discussion were being
produced. This dual process of reification created points of focus around which the
discussion became organized. Some of these reified aspects would later be modified
again to repair misalignments or incoherence.
As the discussion was moving forward, each participant was going back-and-forth
between the high-level description of the grid that was emerging out of these meetings,
and some local aspects of the grid that he or she was more specifically working on.
This dynamic between the ill-structured frame that all participants were developing
in common, and the local use of this frame in individual research projects, was a way
to identify and correct inconsistencies.
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4.5.2 Emergence of the energy prosumer as a boundary object
The concept of energy prosumer emerged as the main point of focus around which
the discussion became organized. The word prosumer is a portmanteau formed by
contracting the word producer with the word consumer. In the literature, the concept
of prosumer has been mainly used as an abstract concept merging the economic
functions of consumers and producers [147, 143, 144, 145, 125]. In the context of
the ACES group, the energy prosumer emerged organically from the discussions as
an undifferentiated entity performing multiple energy functions, contrary to the four
traditional categories limited to perform one single function. The name prosumer
came from the observation that an increasing number of grid actors –in particular the
electricity end-users– were to consume, but also produce electricity moving forward.
Later in the discussion, the prosumer object was also equipped with two additional
functions, the ability to store, and the ability to transport electricity.
The prosumer object is both conceptual and material. It is at the same time an
abstract representation of a class of electricity grid components, a cyber-physical sys-
tem that can monitor and manage generation, consumption, storage, and transmission
assets owned and controlled by a prosumer owner, and a decision-making entity that
has objectives associated with the control and utilization of electricity. These objec-
tives are aligned with the goals of the prosumer owner –individual or organization–
and relate to preferences expressed in terms of economic value, efficiency, security,
comfort and/or sustainability.
A fundamental property of the prosumer object is that virtually every component
of the electricity grid can be represented as a prosumer, across any scale of space
(spatial occupation) or time (lifetime) as shown in Fig. 4.4. A home, a building,
a power transformer are all prosumers. A utility grid, a microgrid, and a laptop
computer can also be represented as prosumers.
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Figure 4.4: Representation of energy prosumers at various scales of time and space.
Other properties of the energy prosumer include typical characteristics of bound-
ary objects [162]:
1. Modularity: each community of practice concerned with the future electricity
grid can relate its activities to at least one specific portion of the prosumer.
Technology vendors implement systems that enable the prosumer functions;
economists analyze what motivates the goal of the prosumer owner; policymak-
ers craft legislation to regulate the prosumer functions, etc.
2. Abstraction: all perspectives are served at once by deletion of features that are
specific to each perspective. For example, an electric vehicle can be seen as an
energy prosumer by deleting all its specific features such as its ability to move
individuals and goods in space and time.
3. Accommodation: each community of practice can accommodate the prosumer to
its own activities, developing specific features tailored to their local needs when
needed. For example, specific energy scheduling algorithms can be developed
for residential prosumers [70].
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4. Standardization: the information contained in a boundary object is in pre-
specified form so that each community of practice knows how to deal with it
locally. In the case of the energy prosumer, the information is organized into
an objective or utility function, and four energy functions: produce, transport,
consume, and store.
4.5.3 Towards a boundary infrastructure for the future electricity grid
The energy prosumer, as a cyber-physical system, is not isolated: it exchanges energy
and information with other prosumers. The concept of energy services emerged from
the discussions to refer to these exchanges that take place through either bilateral
contracts or market actions. Each type of energy service is to include particular
specifications based on the desired performance of the service and the objectives it
intends to meet. At the same time, some features are likely to be common to every
energy service: price, time of delivery, identity of the buyer and seller, etc. Thus,
energy services are also boundary objects whose exact meaning and characteristics in
the context of the future electricity grid are to be negotiated.
Prosumers and energy services are two classes of boundary objects that can be
used to represent both the elements and interfaces that constitute the electricity grid.
The current, hierarchical organization of the grid can be described as nested, with
higher levels consisting of, and containing, lower levels (Fig. 4.5, left). The national
electricity grid consists of, and contains all the large interconnections. Each inter-
connection consists of, and contains various transmission and distribution networks.
These entities contain not only a network, but also the various customers they serve.
Similarly, each home grid consists of the multiple electric devices it contains: comput-
ers, light bulbs, appliances, etc. All of these entities can also be modeled as energy
prosumers and their interactions as energy services (Fig. 4.5, right), giving birth to
a new, flat representation of the electricity grid. At the prosumer level, prosumer
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owners pursue their own objectives while at the system level, experts and elected
officials set objectives for the entire grid.
The concepts of rules and mechanisms defined in hierarchy theory [4] can be used
to characterize the dynamics of the structure obtained. At the system level, rules are
set for the common good. These rules constrain both the way energy prosumers buy
and sell energy services externally, and the way their internal functions –consume,
produce, store and transport electricity– are implemented. At the prosumer level,
prosumer owners set mechanisms that allow them to pursue their objectives within the
rules set at the system level. These mechanisms can take the form of hardware and/or
software technology enabling one or several of the four functions. Both the rules set at
the system level and the mechanisms set at the prosumer level are boundary objects
whose meaning and characteristics are to be negotiated.
The electricity grid can therefore be modeled as a system of boundary objects in-
teracting with each other: energy prosumers, energy services, rules and mechanisms.
Bowker and Star [10] introduce the concept of boundary infrastructure to refer to such
objects that cross larger levels of scale than boundary objects. A boundary infras-
tructure is a cross-contextual information system that serves multiple communities-
of-practice simultaneously, be these within a single organization, or distributed across
multiple organization as is the case with the electricity grid (Fig. 4.3). Any given
community of practice can interface with the infrastructure, pull out the kinds of
information objects it needs, and tailor some of these objects to the local needs.
4.5.4 Discussion
4.5.4.1 Implications of the ACES example: Process observed, objects created,
scale limitations
Though small in scale, the ACES example provides valuable insights on the use of
brokers and boundary objects to foster cooperation among communities-of-practice






















































































The boundary infrastructure jointly produced through discussion and negotiation
is a model of form representing both the elements and interfaces that constitute the
electricity grid; it helped reduce the distances between the different communities-of-
practice represented within the group, be these conceptual (multiple disciplines rep-
resented), temporal (new members regularly joining and others leaving the group) or
cultural (multiple nationalities and cultural backgrounds); it served as an information
structure across context and facilitated the establishment of several trans-disciplinary
research projects related to the future electricity grid.
Through back-and-forth movements between the common and tailored forms of
the boundary infrastructure that was being produced, each member participated in
defining a shared vision of the whole system and developed specific features at some
local levels with the common structure in mind. This suggests that the development,
negotiation and use of boundary objects can help reduce the distortions in objec-
tives, models and implementations that inevitably arise between the local and system
standpoints.
A fundamental contribution of the boundary infrastructure produced is its flex-
ibility over time. Contrary to the rigid representation of the grid currently in use,
the boundary infrastructure developed –and in particular the concept of prosumer—
can be used to model any grid component in today’s and tomorrow’s electricity grid,
when grid entities gain access to additional energy functions and services. The bound-
ary infrastructure proposed can therefore support the development of timelines [167]
showing multiple dimensions of change and multiple states –or “stable intermediate
forms” [93]—of the same system, but using the same representation.
The various communities represented within the ACES laboratory were able to
self-manage their interactions and the objects they produced. Could this approach
be extended at a larger scale, with a much larger number of actors and communities?
125
Practically speaking, how can these various communities –with different concerns, lan-
guages, forms of interaction, and practices—succeed in establishing and maintaining
cooperation? And how can their actions –and the boundary objects they produce– be
managed in practice? We address these questions in section 4.6 through the concept
of boundary organization.
4.5.4.2 Boundary objects vs. standardization: Differences in the context of the
electricity grid
Standards and boundary objects are interrelated concepts: both standards and bound-
ary objects arise over time from durable cooperation among communities [10], and
the term boundary object was initially introduced as one of two major factors that
contributed to the successful cooperation between biologists and amateur naturalists,
along with methods standardization [140].
While Star and Griesemer found methods standardization to be necessary, they
did not find it sufficient to enable the type of cross-contextual cooperation that is
needed today to support the development of a vision for the future electricity grid.
The processual nature of the informational space –in particular the back-and-forth
movements between common and local descriptions– and the fact that both people
and information objects inhabit multiple contexts require a “richer vocabulary than
that of standardization or formalization” [10], namely the use of boundary objects.
The concept of naturalization characterizes the difference between standardization
and boundary objects. A community of practice is defined in large part according to
the co-use of objects –tools, artifacts, techniques, ideas, etc.– that mediate its action.
These objects exist, with respect to a community, along a trajectory of naturaliza-
tion. The degree of naturalization of an object evolves over time as a “measure of
taken-for-grantedness”: the more naturalized the object becomes, the more it loses
its “anthropological strangeness”. Boundary objects such as the energy prosumer are
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working arrangements that both arise from, and resolve the differences of naturaliza-
tion that inevitably occur between communities. They do so without imposing across
the board a naturalization of categories from one community in particular, or from
an outside source of standardization [10]. Over time, boundary objects tend to evolve
into standardized objects: their ill-structured (common) and well-structured (local)
aspects progressively become equivalent and the same objects become naturalized in
several communities. New residual categories are then generated from which new
boundary objects can rise [139].
In the U.S., the technology-centered approach of the past decade put a strong
emphasis on technology standardization through the development of smart grid inter-
operability standards. The EISA of 2007 directed the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) to “coordinate the development of a framework that includes
protocols and model standards for information management to achieve interoperabil-
ity of smart grid devices and systems”; the GridWise Architecture Council identified
areas where standardization were needed to allow technical, information and organi-
zational interoperability [146]; finally, the IEEE Standards Association published a
draft guide for smart grid interoperability [74].
Technology standardization is important and should continue to receive attention.
But the successful development of a vision for the future grid requires expanding both
the scope of action –moving from a technology-focused approach to a more holistic
approach integrating system architecture considerations– and the means of action –
encouraging the use of brokers and boundary objects. Considering the architecture
of the future electricity grid as a system of boundary objects will foster cooperation
across contexts and help establish consensus across communities. Once one particular
reference architecture –that is, a template solution for an architecture– becomes nat-
uralized in a sufficient number of communities and implementations of this reference
architecture have been proposed and tested, it will progressively become standard
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within and across the multiple worlds in which it is naturalized.
4.6 Scaling-up: A boundary organization in charge of de-
veloping architecture models
We initially approached the grid architecture problem in two ways: as an ill-defined
problem, and as a market failure. After reframing the problem in term of communities-
of-practice, we introduced the concepts of brokers and boundary objects as tools that
could be used to build bridges between these communities and facilitate cooperation.
As illustrated in the ACES case, brokers and boundary objects can be proposed as
non-conventional means to address the ill-defined nature of the problem. In this sec-
tion, we now turn to the market failure aspects of the problem, and the need for a
scalable approach, possibly up to the national level.
4.6.1 Form of government intervention
It is widely accepted that the transition process towards a smarter electricity grid
requires at least some level of government oversight. This is due in part to the
communal nature of the electricity grid and its direct impact on the economy and
national security. More specifically, it has been recognized that “national leadership
is needed to create a shared vision of the future [of the electricity grid]” (emphasis
added) [30].
The fact that no system architecture has emerged in the literature after ten years
of prevailing technology-oriented programs serves as ex-post evidence that markets
alone cannot converge to an architecture for the future grid in the desired time frame.
This ex-post evidence adds to our previous ex-ante analysis focusing on externalities
and public good aspects. While government should let markets drive the architec-
ture implementation, there is a need for some public intervention to expedite the
development of architecture models for the future national grid.
What form of intervention is appropriate, and how public leadership should be
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articulated? In the rest of this section, we propose to address the need for public
intervention through the creation of a boundary organization in charge of developing
architecture models for the future U.S. grid.
4.6.2 Boundary organizations
Boundary organizations provide an institutionalized space “between politics and sci-
ence” [60] where multiple communities participate in the “co-production” [78] of
knowledge and social order. In the context of boundary organizations, the term “pol-
itics” is used in its broadest definition to include policy, legislative, management, and
resource allocation decisions, and the term “science” refers broadly to any learning
process that builds and organizes knowledge in a systematic way.
Boundary organizations theory has been developed in a variety of science-policy
contexts including climate [2, 21, 100], health [60, 82], agriculture [19, 20], and water
[164]. The theory draws on the notion of boundary work –the negotiation of social
boundaries between what is ‘politics’ and what is ‘science’ [52, 53]– and on the idea
that blurring these boundaries can lead to more productive policy making [76, 79].
Guston suggested three criteria to characterize boundary organizations: (1) they
provide the opportunity and sometimes the incentives for the creation and use of
boundary objects; (2) they involve the participation of actors from both sides of the
boundary as well as professionals who serve a mediating role; (3) they are distinctly
accountable to both political and scientific institutions [60, 61]. Cash also suggested
that boundary organizations (a) serve to frame and define the scale of problems, (b)
mediate information flows, and (c) capitalize on advantages of scale [20].
Because of their dual accountability, boundary organizations provide an oppor-
tunity for the stabilization and negotiation of the boundary space between science
and politics. From a principal-agent perspective, boundary organizations are agents
accountable and responsive to both scientific and political principals. This need to
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respond to several principals prescribes a balanced and stable approach to the orga-
nization’s mission [61].
Despite being a relatively new concept in policy-making circles, boundary organi-
zations can be proposed as an institutionalized form adapted to the co-production of
architecture models for the future electricity grid between the various communities
involved.
4.6.3 The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP): a boundary orga-
nization?
Over the past decade, the SGIP has probably been the only organization in the
U.S. to make tangible, publicly-available contributions towards the development of
architecture models for the future electricity grid. We propose to analyze and compare
the SGIP’s mission and structure to Guston’s criteria for characterizing boundary
organizations.
The SGIP was established by NIST in late 2009 as a public-private partnership
to support its responsibility under the EISA of 2007 to coordinate standards devel-
opment for the Smart Grid. As of April 2012, the SGIP was comprised of over 750
member organizations representing 22 stakeholder categories, with more than 2,000
individuals participating in SGIP activities. As of January 2013, the SGIP transi-
tioned to “SGIP 2.0”, a self-sustaining, legal entity that retains a working partnership
with NIST [116].
The SGIP has three primary functions: (1) to oversee activities intended to ex-
pedite the development of interoperability and cyber security specifications within
standards-setting organizations; (2) to provide technical guidance to facilitate the
development of standards for a secure, interoperable smart grid; and (3) to specify
testing and certification requirements necessary to assess the interoperability of smart
grid-related equipment [114].
The SGIP, through its Smart Grid Architecture Committee (SGAC), has also
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developed a “reference model”, that is “a set of views (diagrams) and descriptions
that are the basis for discussing the characteristics, uses, behavior, interfaces, require-
ments, and standards of the Smart Grid” [115]. This model essentially extends the
traditional representation of the electricity grid by building additional categories on
top of the four traditional categories (Fig. 4.2).
Three fundamental factors have greatly limited the SGIP’s efforts on developing
shared architecture models for the future grid: its focus on interoperability, a lim-
ited involvement of policymakers, and the absence of dual accountability. First, the
SGIP has been mainly focused on interoperability since its creation, considering the
development of architecture models only as a means to enable smart grid interoper-
ability (cf. section II-D-4). Second, policymakers were only remotely involved in the
SGIP’s activities. Since its creation, the SGIP participated in the creation and use of
boundary objects related to the future architecture of the grid –although they were
not referred to as such– including its “reference model”. However, the various actors
participating in the elaboration and negotiation of these objects were predominantly
coming from the scientific side of the boundary. NIST also provided human resources
to assist with technical and operational aspects of the work, but these resources were
primarily scientific experts, not policymakers. Third, because of the disconnect be-
tween the SGIP’s main objective –to enable interoperability– and the broader policy
objectives for the future grid, the SGIP has never been responsible and accountable
to the policy side of the boundary, in particular regarding its activities related to the
development of an architecture for the future grid. The fact that SGIP 2.0 is now
legally and financially independent from NIST does not prefigure a change in that
matter.
Therefore, despite its significant and valuable efforts to compile existing smart
grid standards and identify and address standards gaps, the current structure of the
SGIP does not meet the criteria defining boundary organizations because of a limited
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involvement of policymakers and the absence of dual accountability (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Comparison between Guston’s criteria for boundary organizations and
NIST SGIP
(1) Creation and use of
boundary objects
(2) Participation of actors
from both sides of the
boundary
(3) Dual accountability





NIST SGIP l w m
4.6.4 Needed: a boundary organization in charge of designing architec-
ture models for the future electricity grid
The concept of boundary organizations can be proposed as an institutionalized form
adapted to the co-production of architecture models for the future electricity grid
between science and policy actors. In particular, actors coming from the policy side
should not be limited to technical advisors –as with the SGIP—but also include
policymakers, and the organization should have distinct lines of responsibility and
accountability to both political and scientific worlds.
The creation and operation of such boundary organization dedicated to the future
grid architecture would change the current situation where architecture development
is subordinated to grid interoperability and replace architecture development at the
top of the pyramid. This organization could also go beyond the science-policy dimen-
sion to incorporate levels of organization, from the local to the state and the national
level, and link science and policy across different levels [20]. The U.S. energy policy
is notoriously suffering from inconsistent policies across different levels of scales, and
such organization would ensure architecture consistency across scales.
132
4.7 Conclusion: findings and recommentations
The development of new architecture models for the future electricity grid is nec-
essary in response to three challenges. First, the future electricity grid will lack a
central management authority, but shall continue to perform some centrally agreed-
upon purposes in a collaborative manner. Thus, new architecture models are needed
to guide future evolutions through stable intermediate forms, and serve as a structure
around which future collaboration can take place. Second, the blurring of knowledge
boundaries between the various disciplines concerned with the grid has created the
need for a new ontology that transcends these boundaries. Thus, new architecture
models are needed to create a common universe of discourse between the discussants
involved in grid modernization efforts. Third, the traditional, four-category repre-
sentation of the grid is too rigid to accurately describe the emerging functions of the
grid. Thus, new architecture models are needed to accommodate for the new storage
function and the emerging decision-making entities performing multiple functions.
Although the need for new architecture models has been identified in some cir-
cles, the recent efforts to address this need have been undermined by confusions in
terminology, the persistence of legacy representations, and the predominance of in-
teroperability considerations. These difficulties also relate to the very nature of the
problem. The grid architecture problem –namely the absence of architecture— can
be framed as both a market failure –legitimizing government intervention– and an
ill-defined problem –requiring the development of non-conventional methods of solu-
tion. The substantive problem can be conceptualized as distances –spatial, temporal,
conceptual and cultural– that prevent the various communities-of-practice involved
to effectively cooperate.
The concepts of brokers and boundary objects can be proposed to address the ill-
defined nature of the grid architecture problem. Brokers experience the gaps –and in
particular the conceptual gaps—between the communities of which they are members
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as cognitive dissonances; they develop strategies to reduce these gaps ‘internally’.
Boundary objects allow multiple communities-of-practice to confront and contrast
‘externally’ the facts and norms conditioning their problem definition or solution.
We illustrated on a small-scale example how architecture models considered as
boundary objects could be developed in the presence of brokers. The concept of
boundary organizations can be proposed as an institutionalized form adapted to scale-
up this approach. We showed that the SGIP –the only prominent organization in the
U.S. to make tangible, publicly-available contributions towards the development of
grid architecture models over the past decade—was lacking some of the characteristics
of a boundary organization.
Based on these findings, we formulate the following policy recommendations to
expedite the development of architecture models for the future electricity grid:
1. Formally recognize the necessity to develop architecture models for the electric-
ity grid of the future, and acknowledge the need for public intervention due to
the incapacity of markets to supply such models.
2. Encourage major, cross-disciplinary evolutions in academic curricula that sup-
port the emergence of a new type of electricity grid professionals with knowledge
in multiple specialties, and facilitate the creation of trans-disciplinary research
programs on electricity grid.
3. Create a boundary organization specifically in charge of developing architecture
models for the future electricity grid. This organization should involve the
participation of actors from both sides of the boundary (science and policy) as
well as brokers serving as mediators
4. Support the active participation of policymakers in the boundary organization




Table 4.4: Individuals or organizations likely to affect or be affected by the future




Residential, Commercial, Industrial, Government including the Military.
Grid elements
vendors
Companies involved in the design, manufacturing, distribution, installation,
maintenance and dismantling of the elements (hardware and software)
constituting the grid as a cyber-physical system, at any scale (from




Companies involved in the design, manufacturing, distribution, installation,
maintenance and dismantling of devices taking electricity in input and
delivering a direct service to human beings in output (Ex: appliances, light




Organization which issue test certificates or manufacture equipment used





Organizations that create national or international standards specifications
through an open, public process.
Rentier states Countries/states/regions deriving a substantial portion of their revenues from




Companies involved in the extraction, transportation, transformation, and
distribution of fuels for electricity generation and/or transportation: coal,





Investor-owned utilities; Municipal utilities and public utility districts; Rural
electric co-ops; Federal power agencies; Public power agencies; Power pools.
Pure plays,
generation segment













Electric marketers; Financial service companies.
Regulatory bodies Federal level: FERC, NIST, EPA, NERC; State level: States commissions;
local level: local governments for Municipals, co-op boards for rural electric
co-ops.
Government bodies Federal level: DOE, DOD, DOT, DHS, DOC, DOL (executive) and Congress
(legislative); State level (executive and legislative).
Research
organizations (not
part of a company)





From venture capitalists investing in startup companies to private investors,
banks, and donors supporting an advocacy group.
Advocacy groups Groups advocating on behalf of an organization or a group of organizations
(e.g. coal industry, utility industry, wind turbine industry, consumers, etc.).
Groups advocating for a specific goal/objective that relates to the grid (e.g.
sustainability, energy security, etc.).
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Education bodies Universities (initial education) as well as professional organizations
(continuing education) that train and educate individuals in fields that relate
to the grid (engineering, policy, environment, finance, etc.).
Support services
companies
Any company providing support services to any of the actors listed above
(legal, accountancy, consultancy, etc,).
137
REFERENCES
[1] Abbott, M., “Is the security of electricity supply a public good?,” The Elec-
tricity Journal, vol. 14, pp. 31 – 33, 2001.
[2] Agrawala, S., Broad, K., and Guston, D. H., “Integrating climate fore-
casts and societal decision making: challenges to an emergent boundary orga-
nization,” Science, Technology, and Human Values, no. 4, p. 454, 2001.
[3] Ahuja, R. K. and Orlin, J. B., “Inverse optimization,” Operations Research,
vol. 49, no. 5, pp. 771–783, 2001.
[4] Allen, T. F. H. and Starr, T. B., Hierarchy : Perspectives for ecological
complexity. University of Chicago Press, 1982.
[5] Anghelita, P., Chefneux, M., Balaban, R., and Trocan, L., “Energy
storage systems for buildings equipped with photovoltaic cells,” in 3rd Int.
Symp. Electr. Electron. Eng. (ISEEE), pp. 332–335, 2010.
[6] Batterman, S., Martins, A., Antunes, C., Freire, F., and Gameiro da
Silva, M., “Development and application of competencies for graduate pro-
grams in energy and sustainability.,” Journal of Professional Issues in Engi-
neering Education and Practice, vol. 137, no. 4, pp. 198 – 207, 2011.
[7] Bieberstein, N., Service-oriented architecture compass : business value, plan-
ning, and enterprise roadmap. IBM Press, 2006.
[8] Bohn, R. E., S. J. E., “How much information? A 2009 report on american
consumers,” 2009.
[9] Borbely, J.-M. and Kredier, J. F., Distributed generation–The power
paradigm of the new millennium. CRC, 2001.
[10] Bowker, G. C. and Star, S. L., Sorting things out: Classification and its
consequences. MIT Press, 1999.
[11] BPC, “Policies for a modern and reliable US Electric grid,” 2013.
[12] Brown, J. S. and Duguid, P., “Structure and spontaneity: Knowledge and
organization,” in Managing industrial knowledge (Nonaka, I. and Teece, D.,
eds.), London: Sage Publications, 2001.
[13] Buchanan, J. M., The demand and supply of public goods. Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1968.
138
[14] California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), “CPUC adopts rules
to protect the privacy and security of customer electricity usage data,” in Press
release, Jul. 28, 2011.
[15] Campbell, D. T., “Ethnocentrism of disciplines and the fish-scale model of
omniscience,” in Interdisciplinary collaboration: An emerging cognitive science
(Derry, S. J., Schunn, C. D., and Gernsbacher, M. A., eds.), London:
Sage Publications, 2005.
[16] Campoccia, A., Dusonchet, L., Telaretti, E., and Zizzo, G., “Eco-
nomic impact of ice thermal energy storage systems in residential buildings
in presence of double-tariffs contracts for electricity.,” in 6th Int. Conf. Eur.
Energy Market (EEM), 2009.
[17] Carlile, P. R., “A pragmatic view of knowledge and boundaries: Boundary
objects in new product development,” Organization Science, no. 4, pp. 442–455,
2002.
[18] Carlile, P. R., “Transferring, translating, and transforming: An integrative
framework for managing knowledge across boundaries.,” Organization Science,
no. 5, pp. 555–568, 2004.
[19] Carr, A. and Wilkinson, R., “Beyond participation: Boundary organiza-
tions as a new space for farmers and scientists to interact,” Society and Natural
Resources, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 255 – 265, 2005.
[20] Cash, D. W., “‘in order to aid in diffusing useful and practical information’:
Agricultural extension and boundary organizations.,” Science, Technology, and
Human Values, no. 4, p. 431, 2001.
[21] Cash, D. W. and Moser, S. C., “Linking global and local scales: Design-
ing dynamic assessment and management processes,” Global Environmental
Change, vol. 10, pp. 109 – 120, 2000.
[22] CEN-CENELEC-ETSI Smart Grid Coordination Group, “Smart grid
reference architecture,” 2012.
[23] Chen, C., Kishore, S., and Snyder, L., “An innovative rtp-based residential
power scheduling scheme for smart grids,” in IEEE International Conference on
Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), pp. 5956–5959, May 2011.
[24] Chen, J., Yang, B., and Guan, X., “Optimal demand response schedul-
ing with stackelberg game approach under load uncertainty for smart grid,” in
IEEE Third International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (Smart-
GridComm), pp. 546–551, 2012.
[25] Chen, X., Wei, T., and Hu, S., “Uncertainty-aware household appliance
scheduling considering dynamic electricity pricing in smart home,” Smart Grid,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 932–941, 2013.
139
[26] Chen, Z., Wu, L., and Fu, Y., “Real-time price-based demand response
management for residential appliances via stochastic optimization and robust
optimization,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 1822–1831,
2012.
[27] Choi, B. C. K. and Pak, A. W. P., “Multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity
and transdisciplinarity in health research, services, education and policy: 1.
definitions, objectives, and evidence of effectiveness,” Clinical and Investigative
Medicine., vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 351 – 364, 2006.
[28] Conejo, A., Morales, J., and Baringo, L., “Real-time demand response
model,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 236–242, 2010.
[29] Depuru, S., Wang, L., Devabhaktuni, V., and Gudi, N., “Smart meters
for power grid–challenges, issues, advantages and status,” in IEEE/PES Power
Systems Conference and Exposition (PSCE), pp. 1–7, 2011.
[30] DOE, “‘Grid 2030’: A national vision for electricitys second 100 years,” 2003.
[31] DOE, “National electric delivery technologies roadmap,” 2003.
[32] Dong, M., Meira, P., Xu, W., and Chung, C., “Non-intrusive signature ex-
traction for major residential loads,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 4,
no. 3, pp. 1421–1430, 2013.
[33] Dunn, B., Kamath, H., and Tarascon, J.-M., “Electrical energy storage
for the grid: A battery of choices,” Science, 2012.
[34] Dunn, W. N., Public policy analysis: An introduction. 4th ed: Pearson, 2007.
[35] Electric Power Research Institute, “Report to NIST on the smart grid
interoperability standards roadmap,” 2013.
[36] Emad, G. and Roth, W.
[37] EPRI, “EPRI-DOE handbook of energy storage for transmission and distribu-
tion applications,” 2003.
[38] Fagerberg, J., Mowery, D. C., and Nelson, R. R., The Oxford handbook
of innovation. New York : Oxford University Press, 2006.
[39] Faghih, A., Roozbehani, M., and Dahleh, M. A., “On the value and price-
responsiveness of ramp-constrained storage,” Energy Conversion and Manage-
ment, vol. 76, pp. 472 – 482, 2013.
[40] Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), “A national assess-
ment of demand response potential,” 2009.
[41] Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), “National action
plan on demand response,” 2010.
140
[42] Fernando, A., Jos, O., and Jos, C., “Open standards and open source:
enabling interoperability,” International Journal of Software Engineering and
Applications, no. 1, p. 1, 2011.
[43] Fischer, G., “Social creativity: Turning barriers into opportunities for collab-
orative design,” in 8th Participatory Design Conference, 2004.
[44] Fisher, E. B. and Schoenberger, E., “Who’s driving the bus: The im-
portance of interdisciplinary awareness on the road to sustainability,” in IEEE
Energy 2030 Conference, 2008.
[45] Fuchs, H. U., The dynamics of heat. Springer.
[46] Garraway, J., “Creating productive interactions between work and the
academy,” Higher Education, no. 3, pp. 447–464, 2006.
[47] Gatsis, N. and Giannakis, G., “Decomposition algorithms for market clear-
ing with large-scale demand response,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,
vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 1976–1987, 2013.
[48] Gellings, C. W., C. J. H., Demand side management: Concepts and meth-
ods. Fairmont Press, 1993.
[49] Gide, A., Les nourritures terrestres. Mercure de France, 1897.
[50] Gide, A., The fruits of the earth. Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1949.
[51] Giebel, G., B. R. K. G. D. M. D. C., “The state of the art in short-term
prediction of wind power,” 2011.
[52] Gieryn, T. F., “Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-
science: Strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists,” American
Sociological Review, no. 6, pp. 781–795, 1983.
[53] Gieryn, T. F., “Boundaries of science,” in Handbook of science and technology
studies (Jasanoff, S., Markle, G. E., Peterson, J. C., and Pinch, T.,
eds.), London: Sage Publications, 1994.
[54] Grijalva, S., Costley, M., and Ainsworth, N., “Prosumer-based control
architecture for the future electricity grid,” in IEEE International Conference
on Control Applications (CCA), pp. 43–48, 2011.
[55] Grijalva, S. and Tariq, M., “Prosumer-based smart grid architecture en-
ables a flat, sustainable electricity industry,” in IEEE PES Innovative Smart
Grid Technologies (ISGT), pp. 1–6, 2011.
[56] Guan, X., Xu, Z., and Jia, Q.-S., “Energy-efficient buildings facilitated by
microgrid,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 243–252, 2010.
141
[57] Gudi, N., Wang, L., Devabhaktuni, V., and Depuru, S., “Demand re-
sponse simulation implementing heuristic optimization for home energy man-
agement,” in North American Power Symposium (NAPS), pp. 1–6, 2010.
[58] Guille, C. and Gross, G., “A conceptual framework for the vehicle-to-grid
(v2g) implementation,” Energy Policy, vol. 37, pp. 4379 – 4390, 2009.
[59] Gungor, V., Sahin, D., Kocak, T., Ergut, S., Buccella, C., Cecati,
C., and Hancke, G., “Smart grid technologies: Communication technologies
and standards,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, vol. 7, no. 4,
pp. 529 – 539, 2011.
[60] Guston, D. H., “Stabilizing the boundary between us politics and science:
The role of the office of technology transfer as a boundary organization.,” Social
Studies of Science, no. 1, p. 87, 1999.
[61] Guston, D. H., “Boundary organizations in environmental policy and science:
An introduction,” Science, Technology, and Human Values, no. 4, p. 399, 2001.
[62] Henderson, K., On line and on paper: visual representations, visual culture,
and computer graphics in design engineering. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999.
[63] Henderson, R. M. and Clark, K. B., “Architectural innovation: The recon-
figuration of existing product technologies and the failure of established firms,”
Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 9 – 30, 1990.
[64] Herter, K., “Residential implementation of critical-peak pricing of electric-
ity,” Energy Policy, vol. 35, pp. 2121–2130, 2007.
[65] Hledik, R., “How green is the smart grid?,” The Electricity Journal, vol. 22,
pp. 29 – 41, 2009.
[66] Hofstede, G., Culture’s consequences : international differences in work-
related values. SAGE Publication, 1980.
[67] Hofstede, G., Cultures and organizations : software of the mind. New York
: McGraw-Hill, 1991.
[68] Hubert, T. and Grijalva, S., “Home energy manager: A consumer-oriented
interactive tool to optimize energy use,” in IEEE International Conference on
Consumer Electronics (ICCE), pp. 505–506, 2011.
[69] Hubert, T. and Grijalva, S., “Realizing smart grid benefits requires energy
optimization algorithms at residential level,” in IEEE PES Innovative Smart
Grid Technologies (ISGT), pp. 1–8, 2011.
[70] Hubert, T. and Grijalva, S., “Modeling for residential electricity optimiza-
tion in dynamic pricing environments,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,
vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 2224–2231, 2012.
142
[71] Hughes, T. P., Networks of power. Electrification in western society, 1880-
1930. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983.
[72] IEEE, “Ieee standard computer dictionary: A compilation of ieee standard
computer glossaries,” 1991.
[73] IEEE, “Ieee standards glossary,” 2010.
[74] IEEE, “Ieee draft guide for smart grid interoperability of energy technology
and information technology operation with the electric power system (eps),
and end-use applications and loads.,” 2011.
[75] Illinois Statewide Smart Grid Collaboration (ISSGC), “Illinois
statewide smart grid collaborative: Collaborative report,” 2010.
[76] Jasanoff, S., The fifth branch: Science advisors as policymakers. Harvard
University Press, 1990.
[77] Jasanoff, S., The Medici Effect: Breakthrough Insights at the Intersection of
Ideas, Concepts, and Cultures. Harvard Business School Press Books, 2004.
[78] Jasanoff, S., States of knowledge : The co-production of science and social
order. New York : Routledge, 2004.
[79] Jasanoff, S., “Is science socially constructed–and can it still inform public
policy,” Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 263 – 276, 1996.
[80] Jia, L. and Tong, L., “Day ahead dynamic pricing for demand response in
dynamic environments,” in IEEE 52nd Annual Conference on Decision and
Control (CDC),, pp. 5608–5613, 2013.
[81] Joo, J.-Y. and Ilic, M., “Multi-layered optimization of demand resources
using lagrange dual decomposition,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 4,
no. 4, pp. 2081–2088, 2013.
[82] Keating, T. J., “Lessons from the recent history of the health effects insti-
tute,” Science, Technology, and Human Values, no. 4, p. 409, 2001.
[83] Khurana, H., Hadley, M., Ning, L., and Frincke, D., “Smart-grid secu-
rity issues,” IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 81 – 85, 2010.
[84] Kirshenbaum, S. R. and Webber, M. E., “Degree courses: Energy should
form its own discipline,” Nature, vol. 478, no. 7367, p. 37, 2011.
[85] Kleinman, D. L., Politics on the endless frontier : postwar research policy in
the United States. Durham : Duke University Press, 1995.
[86] Krahn, G., “Interdisciplinary culture–a result not a goal,” in Interdisciplinary
Workshop on Core Mathematics: Considering Changes in the First Two Years
of Undergraduate Mathematics, 1999.
143
[87] Leonard-Barton, D., Wellsprings of knowledge : building and sustaining the
sources of innovation. Boston, Mass. : Harvard Business School Press, 1995.
[88] Li, N., Chen, L., and Low, S., “Optimal demand response based on utility
maximization in power networks,” in IEEE Power and Energy Society General
Meeting, pp. 1–8, 2011.
[89] Liu, Y. and Chen, M., “A review of nonintrusive load monitoring and its
application in commercial building,” in IEEE 4th Annual International Con-
ference on Cyber Technology in Automation, Control, and Intelligent Systems
(CYBER), pp. 623–629, 2014.
[90] Lorenz, E., Hurka, J., Heinemann, D., and Beyer, H., “Irradiance fore-
casting for the power prediction of grid-connected photovoltaic systems,” IEEE
Journal of Selected Topics in Applied Earth Observations and Remote Sensing,
vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 2–10, 2009.
[91] Luh, P., Ho, Y., and Muralidharan, R., “Load adaptive pricing: An
emerging tool for electric utilities,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 320–329, 1982.
[92] Maharjan, S., Zhu, Q., Zhang, Y., Gjessing, S., and Basar, T., “De-
pendable demand response management in the smart grid: A stackelberg game
approach,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 120–132, 2013.
[93] Maier, M. W. and Rechtin, E., The art of systems architecting. CRC Press,
2009.
[94] Maier, M. W., “Architecting principles for systems-of-systems.,” Systems En-
gineering, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 267–284, 1998.
[95] Mason, R. and Mitroff, I., Challenging strategic planning assumptions:
Theory, cases, and techniques. Wiley-Interscience, 1981.
[96] McDaniel, P. and McLaughlin, S., “Security and privacy challenges in the
smart grid,” IEEE Security Privacy, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 75–77, 2009.
[97] McKinsey, “McKinsey on smart grid,” 2010.
[98] McNaughton, G. and Saint, R., “Enterprise integration implications
for home-area network technologies,” in Innovative Smart Grid Technologies
(ISGT), pp. 1–5, 2010.
[99] Meng, F.-L. and Zeng, X.-J., “An optimal real-time pricing for demand-
side management: A stackelberg game and genetic algorithm approach,” in
International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN), pp. 1703–1710,
2014.
144
[100] Miller, C., “Hybrid management: Boundary organizations, science policy,
and environmental governance in the climate regime,” Science, Technology, and
Human Values, no. 4, p. 478, 2001.
[101] MIT, “The future of the electric grid: An interdisciplinary mit study,” 2011.
[102] Mo, Y., Kim, T.-H., Brancik, K., Dickinson, D., Lee, H., Perrig, A.,
and Sinopoli, B., “Physical security of a smart grid infrastructure,” Proceed-
ings of the IEEE, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 195–209, 2012.
[103] Mohsenian-Rad, A.-H. and Leon-Garcia, A., “Optimal residential load
control with price prediction in real-time electricity pricing environments,”
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 120–133, 2010.
[104] Mohsenian-Rad, A.-H., Wong, V., Jatskevich, J., Schober, R., and
Leon-Garcia, A., “Autonomous demand-side management based on game-
theoretic energy consumption scheduling for the future smart grid,” IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 320–331, 2010.
[105] Moore, K., “Organizing integrity: American science and the creation of pub-
lic interest organizations, 1955-1975,” American Journal of Sociology, no. 6,
p. 1592, 1996.
[106] Moslehi, K. and Kumar, R., “A reliability perspective of the smart grid,”
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 57 – 64, 2010.
[107] Najmeddine, H., El Khamlichi Drissi, K., Pasquier, C., Faure, C.,
Kerroum, K., Diop, A., Jouannet, T., and Michou, M., “State of art
on load monitoring methods,” in IEEE 2nd International Power and Energy
Conference, pp. 1256–1258, 2008.
[108] Narayanamurti, V., Anadon, L. D., and Sagar, A. D., Institutions for
energy innovation: A transformational challenge. Harvard University, 2009.
[109] Narayanamurti, V., Anadon, L. D., and Sagar, A. D., “Transforming
energy innovation,” Issues in Science and Technology, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 57 –
64, 2009.
[110] National Academies Press, “Facilitating interdisciplinary research,” 2005.
[111] National Energy Technlogy Laboratory, “A vision for the modern
grid,” 2007.
[112] National Energy Technlogy Laboratory, “Presentation: Ferc – naruc
smart grid collaborative meeting,” 2008.
[113] National Energy Technlogy Laboratory, “Environmental impacts of
smart grid,” 2011.
145
[114] National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Board of new
smart grid panel ’boots up’ – key position filled and next steps assigned,” 2009.
[115] National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Nist framework
and roadmap for smart grid interoperability standards, release 1.0,” 2010.
[116] National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Nist smart grid
collaboration wiki for smart grid interoperability standards,” 2014.
[117] Olson, G. M. and Olson, J. S., “Distance matters,” Human-Computer In-
teraction, vol. 15, no. 2/3, pp. 139 – 178, 2000.
[118] Pacific Gas and Electric Company, “Smart meter opt-out proposal,” in
proposal filled on Mar. 24, 2011 for CPUC consideration.
[119] Pochet, Y., W. L. A., Production planning by mixed integer programming.
Springer, 2006.
[120] Ponemon Institute, “Perceptions about privacy on the smart grid,” 2009.
[121] Power Systems Engineering Research Center, “Reliability, electric
power, and public vs. private goods: A new look at the role of markets,” 2008.
[122] Power Systems Engineering Research Center, “Notes from the gen-
eral session discussions, future grid initiative workshop, december 7, 2011, at
university of california, berkeley, ca,” 2011.
[123] Qian, L. P., Zhang, Y., Huang, J., and Wu, Y., “Demand response man-
agement via real-time electricity price control in smart grids,” IEEE Journal
on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 31, no. 7, pp. 1268–1280, 2013.
[124] Rittel, H. W. J. and Webber, M. M., “Dilemmas in a general theory of
planning,” Policy Sciences, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 155 – 169, 1973.
[125] Ritzer, G. and Jurgenson, N., “Production, consumption, prosumption:
The nature of capitalism in the age of the digital ‘prosumer’,” Journal of Con-
sumer Culture, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 13 – 36, 2010.
[126] Robinson, J., Economic philosophy. Aldine Pub. Co., 1962.
[127] Roozbehani, M., Materassi, D., Ohannessian, M., and Dahleh, M.,
“Robust and optimal consumption policies for deadline-constrained deferrable
loads,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 5, pp. 1823–1834, July 2014.
[128] Saber, A. and Venayagamoorthy, G., “Efficient utilization of renewable
energy sources by gridable vehicles in cyber-physical energy systems,” IEEE
Systems Journal, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 285–294, 2010.
[129] Saint Marc (de), H., Les champs de braises. Mémoires. Perrin, 1981.
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